Today’s objectives

 

  1. Trace: political economy of independent Ukraine
  2. Consider: why “Russian Spring” didn’t spread beyond Donbas
  3. Discuss: was Russia’s “hybrid warfare” a failure?

 

Early Soviet attempts at “Ukrainization”

  1. Indigenization (korennizatsiya) policy
    1. national minorities were key part of Red coalition in Civil War
    2. Bolsheviks reverse pre-1917 assimilationist policies
    3. expand use of titular languages in union & autonomous republics
  2. “Ukrainizing” Ukraine (1923-1930)
    1. government jobs require Ukrainian fluency (or mandatory courses)
    2. Ukrainian-language education
    3. Ukrainian-language newspapers
    4. Ukrainian-language theaters
    5. Ukrainian-language street signs
  3. Policy is a success (\(\uparrow\) support for Soviets)
    1. Ukrainians as % of party (KP(b)U):
      • 22% in 1922
      • 60% in 1933


 

 

 

Nove chtyvo

 

Return to assimilation

  1. Ukrainization policy terminated (1933)
    1. crop failures blamed on Ukrainian nationalists
    2. Stalin orders reversal of Ukrainization policy
    3. Ukrainian Communist party purge
    4. leading Ukrainian cultural figures arrested, killed
    5. 1938: mandatory Russian instruction in schools
    6. 1939: replace Ukrainian schools with Russian schools in W Ukraine
  2. “Language of friendship of nations”
    1. post-WWII: Russian promoted as lingua franca
    2. Ukrainian not officially banned
    3. but assimilation key to professional advancement, social mobility


 

 

 

 

 

Friendly people

Racing together

 

Ukraine on eve of independence

  1. Census statistics (1989)
    1. nationality (self-reported):
      • 73% Ukrainian, 22% Russian
      • compare to 1926:
        80% Ukrainian, 9% Russian
    2. native language (self-reported):
      • 65% Ukrainian, 33% Russian
    3. Russian lingua franca in Ukraine:
      • Russian: native language for 88% of minority population (Jews, Belorussians, etc.)
      • Ukrainian: native language for 3% of minority population
  2. Political, economic dominance of east
    1. 14 of 20 largest cities on left bank (other 6 are Kyiv, Lviv, Kherson, Mykolayiv, Vinnytsya, Cherkasy)
    2. Donbas is most populous region, center of industry


 

 

 

 

 

End of history

Independent Ukraine

Overview

 

Ukraine after independence

  1. Second-largest country in Europe
    1. 50M population, 600,000km\(^2\)
      (now $$40M population)
    2. resource-rich, industrialized
    3. nuclear-armed (until 1995)
    4. diverse, well-educated population
  2. Tethered by Russian/Soviet legacy
    1. Donbas strikes, regional autonomy movement (1994)
    2. Crimean secession attempt (1995)
    3. Russian Black Sea Fleet in Crimea
    4. homecoming of Crimean Tatars (1989), tension w/ local Russians
    5. resistance to Ukrainian language


 

 

Donbas miners

Black Sea Fleet

 

Political (re-)awakening

  1. Orange Revolution (2004)
    1. protests vs. rigged presidential vote
    2. outcome: new elections, loss of Russia-backed candidate
      (Viktor Yanukovych)
    3. pro-Western leaders take helm
    4. but reforms stalled by infighting, corruption
    5. 2010: Yanukovych wins presidency
  2. Revolution of Dignity (2013-2014)
    1. protests vs. Yanukovych’s rejection of Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement with EU
    2. outcome: Yanukovych flees to Russia, interim govt installed
    3. Ukrainian state in paralysis


 

 

Maidan 1.0

Maidan 2.0

Russian Annexation of Crimea

 

Window of opportunity

  1. Local political response to Euromaidan
    1. rival “anti-Maidan”, “pro-Maidan” (Tatars) protests in Simferopol
    2. local wariness of new Kyiv govt
    3. but no large-scale agitation
  2. Russia’s concept of operations
    1. Spetznaz, VDV covert actions
    2. Russian reinforcements arrive, under cover of exercises
    3. Spetznaz teams seize administrative buildings
    4. Naval Infantry, VDV surround Ukrainian bases, sever lines of communication to mainland
    5. BSF blockades Ukraine navy ships
    6. Ukraine military offered choice: defect or leave
    7. hold referendum on joining Russia


 

 

 

Tough crowd

Little green men

Discussion: What explains Russia’s successful seizure of Crimea?

Balance of power Force employment Geography Information Chance
numbers doctrine distance surprise weather
replacement of losses strategy terrain intelligence timing
industry/production training climate analysis luck
logistics officer quality roads communication
natural resources technology fortifications

 

 

Ostrov Krym

War in Donbas

Overview

 

Donbas (Donets’k \(+\) Luhans’k): Background

  1. Politics
    1. supported Yanukovych
    2. attempted 1994 referendum on regional autonomy, language, economic union with Russian Federation
  2. Demographics
    1. Ukraine’s most populous region
      (6.5M, 15 pct of total pop)
    2. large, but not overwhelming Russian population (38 pct ethnic Russian)
  3. Economics
    1. 2nd largest region by GDP
    2. most heavily-industrialized region of Ukraine, ex-USSR
    3. export-oriented economy
    4. long history of labor activism


GDP

Industry

Exports

 

 

Donbas War: Phase I

  1. Pro-Russia protests (March 2014)
    1. protestors (mostly unarmed) temporarily seize regional administration buildings
    2. demands: federalization, Russian as 2nd official language, RF Customs Union
    3. law enforcement cracks down, arrests protest leaders
  2. Pro-Russia insurgency (April 2014)
    1. armed men (w/ civilian mobs) seize government buildings, proclaim “People’s Republics”
    2. demands: independence, union with Russia
    3. local police defect or flee


 

Territorial control

 

Donbas War: Phase I (cont’d)

  1. Anti-Terrorist Operation (April)
    1. Kyiv launches ATO (JFO)
    2. but Ukraine army paralyzed, stopped by civilians, abandons vehicles without a fight
    3. martial law not announced
  2. Political consolidation (May 2014)
    1. separatist “referenda” held in Donets’k, Luhans’k (May 11)
    2. Ukraine presidential elections (May 25), Poroshenko wins
  3. ATO gathers pace (May-June 2014)
    1. objective: isolate separatists
    2. army lays siege to Slovyans’k
    3. Metinvest (Akhmetov) steel worker militia drives separatists out of Mariupol’


 

Territorial control

 

Donbas War: Phase II

  1. Ukraine on offensive (June-Aug)
    1. siege warfare working
    2. Kyiv regains control of border
    3. takes Slovyans’k, Kramators’k
    4. battle for Donets’k airport
  2. Russia avoids direct action
    1. 40,000 troops on border, as conventional deterrent
    2. sends air defense systems, volunteer fighters
    3. FSB, GRU teams on ground
    4. but no direct, large-scale military support
  3. Decisive moment (August 2014)
    1. Ukraine encircles separatists
    2. cuts territory in two
    3. separatists on cusp of defeat


 

Territorial control

 

Donbas War: Phase III

  1. Russia intervenes (August 24)
    1. brigade-size task force of Russian VDV, mechanized forces streams across border
    2. “humanitarian convoy” cover
    3. Ukraine army defeated at Battle of Ilovaisk
    4. Russians reach Mariupol’
    5. Ukraine: 60% equipment lost
  2. Minsk I ceasefire (September 5)
    1. pull back heavy weapons
    2. OSCE monitoring mission
    3. Ukraine agrees to “decentralize” power
    4. Russia agrees local elections, withdrawal of armed groups
    5. front stabilizes


 

Territorial control

 

Donbas War: Phase III (cont’d)

  1. 2nd Russian offensive (January)
    1. fighting escalates separatists capture Donets’k airport
    2. separatists, Russian troops capture Debal’tseve pocket
    3. shelling of Mariupol’, Kramators’k
  2. Minsk II agreement (February)
    1. Ukraine agrees to amend constitution, grant special status, amnesty for separatists
    2. Russia agrees to restore Ukraine border control
    3. front stabilizes (despite periodic flareups)
    4. but political progress stalled
    5. status quo until 2022


 

Territorial control

Political Economy of the Donbas War

 

What explains local variation in conflict?

  • why did separatists attack some places,
    but not others?
  • why did some towns fall to separatists more quickly than others?

Potential explanations:

  1. Russian support for rebels
    1. necessary, but not sufficient
    2. cannot explain geography, timing of violence or territorial control
  2. Ethnic nationalism
    1. more Russian language/ethnicity \(\to\) more support for separatism
  3. Economic shocks
    1. more local economic dependence on Russia \(\to\) more support for separatism \(\checkmark\)


 

 

 

Economic engine

 

Ethno-linguistic explanations

  1. Primordialist hatreds
    1. deep cultural cleavages, interethnic mistrust
  2. Bargaining failure
    1. issue indivisibility over language
  3. Ethnic exclusion
    1. grievances over perceived anti-Russian discrimination
  4. Collective action
    1. shared language facilitates organization, enforcement
  5. External support
    1. weapons, aid from co-ethnics in Russian Federation

Hypothesis

  • more violence in areas inhabited by Russian speakers / ethnic Russians


 

 

 

Mapa ros. movy

Nosiy movy

 

 

Economic explanations

  1. Negative shocks
    1. less growth \(\to\) unemployment, lower wages
    2. change in terms of trade \(\to\) unemployment, lower wages
  2. Opportunity costs
    1. participation in war rises as the opportunity costs of fighting fall
  3. Looting / predation
    1. financial incentives for opportunistic fighters

Hypothesis

  • more violence in areas potentially harmed by trade openness with the EU and trade barriers with Russia


 

 

 

Working man

Fighting man

 

 

Ukraine’s trade with EU vs. Russia

  1. Export to Russia (pre-2013)
    1. heavy machinery \(\checkmark\)
    2. metals
    3. agricultural products
  2. Import from Russia (pre-2013)
    1. oil and gas
  3. Export to EU (pre-2013)
    1. metals
    2. agricultural products
  4. Import from EU (pre-2013)
    1. heavy machinery \(\checkmark\)
    2. consumer goods


 

 

 

Trade tug-o-war

Donbas’ ‘Big 3’ industries

  1. Metals (least threatened by EU deal)
    1. 50% of industry in Donbas
    2. exports to 50 countries
    3. highly profitable, competitive
  2. Coal (moderately threatened)
    1. heavily subsidized, inefficient
    2. 12% of coal to Russia
    3. 33% of coal to factories dependent on Russian orders
    4. IMF loans require end of subsidies, auctions, closures
  3. Machine-building (most threatened)
    1. 46% of industry in Donbas
      • locomotives, mining equipment, steel furnaces, industrial cranes, rolling mills
    2. 60% of exports to Russia
    3. no domestic demand
    4. not competitive in EU, Asia


 

 

Steel magnate

Rust belt

Which of these better explains the dynamics of the Donbas War?

 

Economics


 

Language

 

 

 

What do the data say?

  1. Places that were more dependent on trade with Russia pre-2013…
    1. saw more pro-Russian violence
    2. fell to rebels earlier in war
  2. Places with more Russian speakers…
    1. also saw more pro-Russian violence
    2. but this effect is more uncertain


 

Economics

Language

 

Discussion
 

Language vs. economics

  1. Which cause of conflict is more “preventable”/amenable to policy?
  2. Should Ukraine have followed the Baltic model?
    (language as requirement for citizenship)
  3. Are there national security advantages to being a bilingual nation?

NEXT MEETING

 

Russian-Ukrainian War: 2022- (Tu, Nov. 28)

  • what are the causes and consequences of military stalemate?
  • what are Ukraine’s lessons for the future of warfare?