Today’s objectives

 

  1. Define: the core elements of nuclear strategy:
    1. second strike capabilities
    2. nuclear triad
    3. counterforce vs. countervalue targeting
    4. missile defense
    5. non-strategic nuclear weapons
  2. Consider: the concept of limited nuclear war, and its place in Soviet/Russian planning

 

Nuclear Time Machine!

 

As the captain of a U.S. navy cargo ship carrying 100 nuclear warheads and delivery systems, you accidentally sail into a time warp and are transported back in time to 1933. You have four options:

  1. Sink the ship, preventing anyone in 1933 from getting the weapons,
  2. Return the weapons to the U.S. government,
  3. Distribute the nuclear arsenal asymmetrically to 2-3 great powers, so that each has a reliable “second-strike” capability,
  4. Distribute the arsenal evenly to as many states as possible
    (second-strike capability not guaranteed for all recipients).

Which option would you choose?

Origins of Nuclear Strategy

 

 

 

I am become Death. Destroyer of worlds

  1. Trinity test, 16 July 1945
    1. first test of nuclear device
    2. New Mexico, USA
    3. 20 kiloton TNT equivalent
  2. Soviet reaction
    1. Truman tells Stalin about test at Potsdam Conference
    2. Stalin already knows
    3. first Soviet test in 1949


 

Trinity Test

Ne boltay

What’s Different About Nukes?

 

 

 

A new kind of weapon?

  1. Tokyo firebombing (9-10 Mar 1945)
    1. 16km\(^2\) destroyed, 100K killed
    2. 334 bombers
    3. 1,665 tons explosive
  2. Hiroshima (6 Aug 1945)
    1. 4mi\(^2\) destroyed, 80K killed
    2. 1 bomber
    3. 15,000 tons TNT equivalent
  3. Nagasaki (9 Aug 1945)
    1. 13mi\(^2\) destroyed, 75K killed
    2. 1 bomber
    3. 21,000 tons TNT equivalent


Tokyo or Hiroshima

Tokyo or Hiroshima

 

 

Could you survive a nuclear strike?

  1. Trinity Test (20kt)
    1. first nuclear bomb tested
    2. same yield as Nagasaki bomb
    3. .1 mi radius: fireball
    4. .5 mi: complete destruction to buildings, 100% fatalities
    5. 1.4 mi: major damage to buildings, 50-90% fatalities, 3rd degree burns
    6. 77mi: fallout cloud
    7. estimated casualties: 38,070 killed, 71,440 injured


Blast site, 20kt

Fallout cloud

 

 

Could you survive a nuclear strike?

  1. Ivy Mike (10Mt)
    1. first H-bomb tested
      (Nov 1952, USA)
    2. 2 mi radius: fireball
    3. 3 mi: complete destruction to buildings, 100% fatalities
    4. 18 mi: major damage to buildings, 50-90% fatalities, 3rd degree burns
    5. 526mi: fallout cloud
    6. 1,127,930 killed, 135,550 injured


Blast site, 10Mt

Fallout cloud

 

 

Could you survive a nuclear strike?

  1. Tsar Bomba (100Mt)
    1. largest nuclear device tested
      (Oct 1961, USSR)
    2. 3.8 mi radius: fireball
    3. 23 mi: complete destruction to buildings, 100% fatalities
    4. 46 mi: major damage to buildings, 50-90% fatalities, 3rd degree burns
    5. 1000mi: fallout cloud
    6. 2,233,100 killed, 2,337,650 injured

 

if in NYC: 7.6M killed, 7M injured


Blast site, 100Mt

Fallout cloud

 

 

The puzzle

  1. Why so many nukes?
    1. fewer than 300 U.S. cities with
      \(>\) 100K population
    2. fewer than 200 Soviet cities with
      \(>\) 100K population
    3. not enough targets!
    4. U.S. plans called for launching entire arsenal simultaneously
    5. even attacking non-aligned countries


 

 

 

Nuclear balance

 

 

Legacy of WWI and WWII

  1. Avoiding strategic stalemate
    1. technological solutions
      • tanks
      • aircraft
      • long-range bombers
      • ballistic missiles (e.g. V2)
    2. new strategic concepts
      • strategic use of air power
        (independent of ground ops)
      • expanded target set
        (military and civilian)
      • target will & capacity to fight

 

Nukes: different in degree or kind?


 

How to avoid this

This is how

Logic of Deterrence

 

 

Early deterrence theory

  1. Bernard Brodie (Absolute Weapon, 1946)
    1. if 2 sides have nuclear weapons, nukes become useless in attack
    2. costs of nuclear attack too high if enemy can retaliate
    3. only purpose: deterrence
      (increasing costs of attack)
  2. New chapter in history of war
    1. nukes not like other weapons
    2. only effective when not used


 

 

 

New era begins

 

Is more better?

  1. How many nukes are enough?
    1. enough \(=\) more than we got
    2. enough to survive enemy’s 1st strike
    3. enough to retaliate, cause unacceptable damage in 2nd strike
  2. How ensure 2nd strike capability?
    1. quantity: more nukes better
      • retaliation requires surplus of nuclear weapons
      • as enemy acquires more nukes, fewer of our nukes will survive
        first strike
    2. deployment: nuclear triad
      1. air
      2. land
      3. sea


 

 

 

A new science

 

 

The Triad (1 of 3)

  1. Air
    (long-range bombers)
    1. oldest delivery vehicle
    2. advantages
      • flexible range
      • large payloads
      • precise delivery
      • can recall at short notice
      • reusable
    3. disadvantages
      • vulnerable on ground and air
      • difficult to sustain high alert for long periods
      • slow


 

 

 

B2 bomber

 

 

The Triad (2 of 3)

  1. Land
    (intercontinental ballistic missiles)
    1. 2nd-oldest delivery vehicle
    2. advantages
      • short flight time
      • high defense penetration
      • high accuracy
      • easy retargetability
      • flexible crisis management
      • low vulnerability to 1st strike
    3. disadvantages
      • not recallable
      • relatively small payloads


 

 

 

Topol ICBM

 

 

The Triad (3 of 3)

  1. Sea
    (submarine-launched ballistic missiles)
    1. newest delivery vehicle
    2. advantages
      • extremely low vulnerability to 1st strike
      • short flight time
    3. disadvantages
      • worse accuracy than ICBM
      • difficult communications
      • inflexible crisis management
      • not recallable
      • relatively small payloads


 

 

 

Trident SLBM

 

Defensive systems

  1. Appeal of ballistic missile defense
    1. reduce number of enemy weapons that reach targets
    2. minimize damage caused by enemy weapons
  2. Can defense be destabilizing?
    1. “yes”
      • investment in defense provokes enemy investment in offense
      • enemy ability to retaliate is necessary for deterrence
      • investment in defense signals 1st strike intention (insulate self from retaliation)
    2. “no”
      • U.S., Russia both capable of penetrating other’s BMD
      • BMD has only a marginal effect on strategic stability


 

 

 

Nike Hercules

 

Counterforce vs. countervalue

  1. Target enemy’s nukes?
    (counterforce targeting)
    1. reduce number of weapons enemy can launch
    2. reduce civilian casualties
    3. but signals 1st strike intention
      (missiles will be gone by 2nd strike)
  2. Target enemy’s population centers?
    (countervalue targeting)
    1. high civilian casualties
    2. signals 2nd strike intention
      (does not prevent retaliation)
    3. considered more stabilizing


 

 

 

Where to strike

How to Win a Nuclear War

 

Discussion

 

  1. Can you “win” a nuclear war? What would victory look like?
  2. What level of damage is unacceptable?
    (percent of population, physical infrastructure, vegetation)

 

Deterring vs. winning conventional war

  1. Strategic nuclear weapons
    1. purpose: win war with nukes alone
    2. original intent: threaten nuclear retaliation for Soviet ground offensive in Europe
    3. but more complicated if Soviets also have nukes
    4. threat of mass retaliation less credible with Soviet 2nd strike
  2. Non-strategic/tactical nuclear weapons
    1. purpose: use nukes for support of (conventional) combat operations
    2. but is it possible to keep nuclear exchange limited?


 

 

 

Nuclear artillery

Soviet Approach to Deterrence

 

Soviet nuclear strategy

  1. Did Soviets buy U.S. deterrence theory?
    1. yes, but not completely
    2. concern that MAD is more fragile than U.S. thinks
      • technical advances to offensive, defense systems will undermine strategic stability
    3. belief that nuclear effects make war costly, but still winnable
  2. Evidence
    1. emphasis on civil defense
    2. Moscow missile defense
    3. deep underground command centers
    4. writings of Soviet military theorists
  3. Official stance
    1. “no first use” policy (1982)
    2. but mismatch between declared policy and doctrine


 

 

 

Just for show?

 

What Soviet political leaders thought

  1. Stalin’s thinking on nukes
    1. just another weapon
    2. strategic balance unchanged
    3. orders military to develop battlefield tactics for nukes
  2. Khrushchev’s thinking
    1. nuclear war unwinnable
    2. but can be effective deterrent
    3. and good cost-savings
    4. permanent nuclear standoff
  3. Brezhnev’s thinking
    1. avoid nuclear war if possible
    2. but keep capability to win


 

 

 

Kuzka’s mother

 

What Soviet military leaders thought

  1. Pre-Cuban Missile Crisis
    (Sokolovskiy, Military Strategy, 1962)
    1. nukes shift objectives from front (enemy forces) to rear (economy, population)
    2. Soviets are upstart nuclear power, lack 2nd strike capability
    3. surprise, 1st strike is decisive
  2. Post-Cuban Missile Crisis
    1. all-out exchange impossible
    2. use of nukes will stay restricted to theater level
    3. regionally limited nuclear war
      • short-range rockets
      • nuclear-capable artillery
      • employment plans for use at theater, lower levels


 

 

 

Sokolovskiy

 

Nukes in Soviet military doctrine

  1. Ground force doctrine
    1. primacy of offensive
    2. use nuclear artillery to tear gaps in enemy defenses
    3. disperse forces to limit damage from nuclear strikes
    4. rely on armor protection from blast, heat, radiation
  2. Naval doctrine
    1. coastal defense is primary mission
    2. limited blue water operations
    3. ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) kept in “bastions” in Barents Sea, Sea of Japan
    4. emphasis on sea denial to keep US subs, carriers away from SSBNs


 

 

 

To the front

To the bastion

Russian Nuclear Strategy, Post-1991

 

Nukes in Russia’s national security strategy

  1. No first use
    1. abandons “no first use” in 1993
    2. reliance on nuclear weapons to offset conventional weaknesses
    3. policy allows for nuclear retaliation in case of conventional attack (if “existence of state” is threatened)
  2. Different approaches for different wars
    1. local war (vs small states)
      • nuclear use mainly demonstrative
    2. regional war (vs coalition of states)
      • nuclear use mainly demonstrative
    3. large-scale war (multiple theaters)
      • strategic use of nukes expected
  3. Escalate to de-escalate?
    1. compel war termination through early use of nuclear arms
    2. but declaratory policy is ambiguous


 

 

 

Duck and cover

NEXT MEETING

 

Russian Military Strategy After the Soviet Collapse (Tu, Nov. 7)

  • How has Russia adapted to loss of empire, superpower status?
  • What has been the focus of Russia’s military reforms? How successful have these reforms been?
  • What kind of force is Russia building now?