Today’s objectives

 

  1. Consider: how Germany adapted its strategy for a long war against a much larger, more resource-rich state
  2. Probe: was it bad strategy or bad implementation?
  3. Analyze: whether Germany’s Plan B could have worked

 

 

Germany’s invasion of Soviet Union
Assumptions

  1. Quick victory is possible
  2. After 1941:
    Victory still possible in long war \(\checkmark\)


 

 

Need new plan

Barbarossa: First 60 days

Balance of power Force employment Geography Information Chance
numbers doctrine distance surprise weather
replacement of losses strategy terrain intelligence timing
industry/production training climate analysis luck
logistics officer quality roads communication
natural resources technology fortifications

Barbarossa: Advance toward Moscow

Balance of power Force employment Geography Information Chance
numbers doctrine distance surprise weather
replacement of losses strategy terrain intelligence timing
industry/production training climate analysis luck
logistics officer quality roads communication
natural resources technology fortifications

Stalingrad to Berlin

Balance of power Force employment Geography Information Chance
numbers doctrine distance surprise weather
replacement of losses strategy terrain intelligence timing
industry/production training climate analysis luck
logistics officer quality roads communication
natural resources technology fortifications

Plan B

 

 

German strategic priorities in 1942

  1. Ends
    1. deny Soviet resupply
      (90 percent of oil production)
    2. seize oil assets for Reich
      (‘if I can’t seize the oils fields of Maikop and Grozny, I must end this war’)
  2. Means
    1. shift away from Moscow, Leningrad
    2. secure oil fields of Caucasus
    3. secure Stalingrad
      • protect northern flank
      • interrupt Soviet supplies


 

 

 

Southern strategy

 

 

Case Blau
three-phase campaign

  1. Encircle Soviet troops west of
    Don River
  2. Establish blocking position in Stalingrad
  3. Main drive into Caucasus

 

Huge front:
Rostov \(\to\) Baku \(=\) 1300 km

 

Discussion:

  • Would the loss the Caucasus have resulted in Soviet defeat?


 

 

 

Three easy steps

Comparative strength, June 1941

Germany

  1. Numbers
    1. 1.3M-1.5M troops
    2. 1,500-2,000 tanks
    3. 1,500-1,600 aircraft
  2. Force structure (74 divisions)
    1. 9 armored divisions
    2. 6 mechanized divisions
    3. 59 infantry divisions
    4. org. into 1 Army Group:
      • South (\(\to\) Don)
    5. split into 2 Army Groups:
      • A (\(\to\) Caucasus)
      • B (\(\to\) Stalingrad)

Soviet Union

  1. Numbers
    1. 2.3-2.7M troops
    2. 3,700 tanks
    3. 1,700 aircraft
  2. Force structure (45 divisions)
    1. 6 armored divisions
    2. 4 mechanized divisions
    3. 35 infantry divisions
    4. organized into 5 Fronts
      • Voronezh
      • Stalingrad
      • South (Kuban’)
      • North Caucasus
      • Transcaucasus
    5. re-organized into 5 Fronts
      • Voronezh
      • Southwest
      • Don (Stalingrad north)
      • Stalingrad (Stgd south)
      • Transcaucasus

Before the Cauldron

Soviet winter offensive, 12/1941 - 5/1942

German summer offensive, 5/1942 - 7/1942

 

 

First 30 days

  1. Soviet Kharkiv offensive, May 1942
    1. attempt to break out of salient
    2. German pincer attack cuts off 3 Soviet armies
    3. killed, wounded, captured:
      • Soviets: 280K
      • Germans: 20K
      • 1:14 loss-exchange ratio
  2. Germans consolidate positions in south
    1. Kerch peninsula caputured in May
    2. Sevastopol seized by July
  3. Germans advance to Don river


 

 

 

Kharkiv debacle

Strategy Change

 

 

 

Case Blau
two simultaneous offensives

  1. Split Army Group South into A and B
    1. Group A \(\to\) Caucasus
    2. Group B \(\to\) Stalingrad
  2. Push to oils fields before northern flank secured in Stalingrad
    1. divert 1st Pz Army to A
    2. Stalingrad left mainly to Paulus’ 6th Army (infantry)

 

Discussion:

  • Should the Germans have stuck to the original plan?
  • Were there other options?


 

 

 

Two steps at once

German summer-fall offensive, 7/1942 - 11/1942

 

Caucasus
German challenges

  1. Strategy
    1. too many objectives
    2. impossible to achieve
      unity of effort
    3. 1,500km gap between
      Army Groups
    4. constant swapping of units between combat zones
    5. drop in strength, readiness, serviceability
    6. Soviet scorched earth campaign – burn oil fields before Germans arrive


 

 

 

Reach vs. grasp

 

Caucasus
German challenges (continued)

  1. Geography
    1. tallest mountains in Europe
    2. ‘wild and untamed’
    3. excellent terrain for ambushes
    4. weather
    5. extended, vulnerable logistics


 

 

Far from home

Into the Cauldron

 

Why urban warfare is hard

  1. Fighting in 3 dimensions
    1. streets
    2. buildings (including interiors)
    3. sewers and tunnels
    4. lines of communication
      not visible on map
  2. Terrain favors defender
    1. ample cover and concealment
    2. local knowledge of area, secret routes, floorplans
    3. multiple hidden entry and exit points, escape routes
    4. hard to destroy underground structures, tunnels
    5. booby traps, snipers, MGs
    6. attacker exposed on streets


 

 

Harder than looks

 

 

 

 

“Not one step back!”

  1. Soviet response
    1. Luftwaffe terror raid does not make city surrender
    2. Stalin’s order No. 227, July 28 – ‘no retreat!’
    3. hold west bank of Volga at all costs, almost no reinforcements
  2. Close quarter fighting
    1. fighting block-by-block, house-by-house, room-by-room


 

 

Tractor factory

Verdun on Volga

Turning point

 

 

Soviet counteroffensive
Operation Uranus, November 1942

  1. Leadership
    1. Zhukov takes over defense of city
    2. complete disregard for casualties
  2. Ends
    1. cut off German troops in Stalingrad from rest of Wehrmacht
  3. Means
    1. pin Germans down in city
    2. counterattack from north, south flanks vs. weakly-defended positions
    3. keep reinforcements to Soviet troops in Stalingrad at minimum


 

MVP?

Soviet counter-offensive, 11/1942

Soviet counter-offensive, 11/1942 (close-up)

Soviet winter offensive, 12/1942 - 2/1943

 

The Cauldron
November 1942 - February 1943

  1. Running on fumes
    1. Pulus’ 6th Army completely surrounded
    2. 210,000 German troops
      trapped in pocket
    3. Hilter refuses to let Paulus
      attempt break-out
    4. no reinforcements, supplies for either side (but esp. Germans)
    5. unsanitary conditions, disease
    6. frigid winter temperatures
  2. The bitter end
    1. Gen Paulus surrenders on Feb. 2


 

Hold…

Hold…

 

 

Costs of Case Blau

  1. Killed, wounded, captured
    1. Germany: 1,013,000
    2. USSR: 2,227,000
    3. 2:1 loss-exchange ratio
  2. but…
    1. Stalingrad not captured
    2. oil fields out of reach
    3. whole eastern front on verge of collapse


 

The prize

The cost

What if?

 

Discussion: Could the Germans have suceeded? 

 

How realistic are these scenarios?

  1. ‘Stalingrad first’ option
    1. fast Panzer drive to Volga
    2. envelop city, take east bank of Volga
    3. but…
      • would need to capture Stalingrad before August
      • follow-up operation in Caucasus may need to wait until 1943
  2. Strategic bombing option
    1. focus on denying oil resources to Soviets
    2. bomb wells, refineries, storage tanks, ports
    3. but…
      • Baku at far end of German bomber range
      • must fly missions without fighter escort
      • local Soviet air superiority
      • lack of local runways
      • bomber losses likely high

Germans go on offensive, 5/1942 - 11/1942

Soviets go on offensive, 11/1942 - 3/1943

Germans go on offensive, 2/1943 - 8/1943

Soviets go on offensive, 8/1943 - 12/1944

Soviets go on offensive, 1/1945 - 5/1945

Hoisting the victory banner for the cameras

Remember this?

NEXT MEETING

 

Origins of the Cold War (Tu, Oct. 31)

  • how did a wartime alliance turn into a global peacetime rivaly?
  • how did the Soviets seek to “catch up and overtake” U.S.?
  • what are the lessons for a potential Cold War 2.0?