Today’s objectives

 

  1. Distinguish: historical varieties of forced labor in Russia
  2. Deduce: economic and political causes of serfdom
  3. Discuss: why this institution lasted so long in Russia, and how it intersected with the state’s national security interests

Why This Topic is Important

  • serfdom has left indelible imprint on Russian economy, institutions

  • economic legacy of serfdom:

    • lower household expenditure
    • less urban agglomeration
    • slower industrial development

  • institutional legacy of serfdom:

    • collectivization, famine
    • forced labor camps
    • internal passports

  • relevance today:

    • serfdom was a legacy of war
    • territorial conquest creates “new realities” on the ground
    • adapting to these “new realities” can profoundly transform state and society


Serf and Lord

Varieties of Forced Labor

  1. Slavery (rabstvo)

    • rights:
      • family
      • property
      • mobility
    • usually war prisoners, civilians from conquered territories
    • still exists in some forms today (forced POW labor in WWII)

  2. Indentured Service (kholopstvo)

    • rights:
      • family
      • property
      • mobility
    • service by contract, sometimes by inheritance
    • worked in house, not farm
    • abolished by Peter I in 1725


Kholopy

Varieties of Forced Labor

  1. Serfdom (krepostnoye pravo)

    • rights:
      • family
      • property
      • mobility
    • peasants tied to land, kept at/below subsistence level through predatory rents
    • originated in 15th Century, abolished in 1861
    • serfdom also existed in West Europe, but mostly ended there by 16th Century


Serfs

Causes of Serfdom

Serfdom as a Legacy of War

Between 1263 (start of Grand Duchy) and 1721 (start of Empire), Muscovite Russia expanded its territory through war 77 times.

 

 

These wars created two problems:

  1. abundance of newly conquered land
  2. demand for a large army to defend, expand this land

War Makes the State

  • war demands institutions that are conducive to state formation:
    - standing army
    - tax revenues (to support army)
    - bureaucracy (to raise revenues)

  • but Muscovy too underdeveloped to support army through taxes

Solution: create landed army

  • Muscovite army was led by servitors (class of warrior nobles)
  • in 1400s, state assigns newly conquered lands to servitors
  • servitors would be responsible for taxation, military mobilization on these lands


Battle for Kazan

Warriors Become Feudal Lords

  • land assignments initially temporary, then hereditary
  • new class of landed nobility born
  • initial bargain with peasants:
    land use in exchange for rents (taxes) and/or military service

Problem: not enough peasants

  • shortage of tenants due to peasant migration to new lands
  • fierce competition between landlords drives rents down

Solution: serfdom

  • state restricts freedom of peasants to move
  • peasants enserfed by mid-1600s


Peasants Moving

A Simple Economic Model of Serfdom

 

 

Simple production function, with one factor (Labor).
Declining returns to scale.

 

 

Take the derivative, and we get the marginal product of labor.
This represents how much each additional laborer contributes.

 

 

Suppose there are \(L_1\) peasants living on this plot of land.
We’ll assume that labor is scarce, so \(L_1\) is pretty small.

 

 

Each of the \(L_1\) peasants receives market wage \(W_1\).
This wage depends on the peasant’s contribution to productivity.

 

 

Let \(s\) denote level of wages needed for basic subsistence.
Suppose \(W_1\) is above subsistence wage \(s\).

 

 

Landlord receives rent from the peasants.
Rent is equivalent to what the peasants produce, minus their wages.

 

 

Peasant get to keep the remaining surplus (to spend/invest/save).
Surplus is what they earn, minus what they spend on subsistence.

 

 

Now suppose there is population growth, from \(L_1\) to \(L_2\).
Peasants’ market wages fall from \(W_1\) to \(W_2\), below subsistence!

 

 

Landlord wins (more tenants \(\to\) more rents).
Peasants lose (lower wages \(\to\) less/no surplus).

 

 

Now suppose a second plot of land opens up (Land B).
Let’s assume this new land is of equal size and quality as Land A.

 

 

Land A is overpopulated, wages are low.
Land B is underpopulated, wages are high (\(L_A\)\(>\)\(L_B\), \(W_A\)\(<\)\(W_B\)).

 

 

Peasants from Land A begin to migrate to Land B, until population levels reach equilibrium (\(L_A^{eq}\), \(L_B^{eq}\)), wages are same (\(W_A^{eq}\)\(=\)\(W_B^{eq}\)).

 

 

This is good for peasants from Land A.
Migration raises their rents above subsistence. Surplus is back!

 

 

But this is bad for landlord A.
Out-migration results in fewer tenants and fewer rents.

 

 

What are landlord A’s options?
(a) do nothing, lose money; (b) lobby government to allow serfdom.

 

 

Serfdom \(=\)
migration restriction \(+\) surplus extraction

Serfdom and Territorial Expansion

Land/labor ratio and serfdom

  • serfdom is a political intervention in the market
  • high land/labor ratio
    (lots of land, few tenants)
    • market favors tenants
    • wages go up, rents go down
    • serfdom more likely
  • low land/labor ratio
    (little land, lots of tenants)
    • market favors landlords
    • wages go down, rents go up
    • serfdom less likely

 

Why does territorial expansion make serfdom more appealing?

 

Why not just stop expanding?


Serfs

Russia’s External Threat Environment (1450-1800)

Belligerent Conflicts Start End
Kazan 3 1467 1487
Novgorod 3 1471 1570
Livonia 1 1477 1478
Lithuania 2 1487 1503
Sweden 21 1495 1742
Crimean Khanate 2 1571 1572
Poland 23 1579 1794
Cossacks 26 1649 1774
Streltsy 2 1682 1698
Ottoman Empire 21 1711 1791
Finland 1 1714 1714
Bashkirs 1 1755 1755
Prussia 10 1757 1760
Polish Confederates 1 1768 1768
France 9 1799 1799

End of Serfdom

Why Did Serfdom Decline?

  • Tsar Alexander II abolished serfdom in 1861

  • at the time, 45% of peasants (38% of total pop) were serfs

  • but the state had created pathways out of serfdom before:

    • permissions to move on case-by-case basis
    • emancipation after 20 years of military service
    • less enforcement in frontier, newly conquered areas

 

Why did the state end serfdom?

 

Were the interests of state and landlords always aligned?


Emancipation

Comparative Perspective

Meanwhile, in Europe…

  • serfdom ended much earlier (after Black Death)
  • landlords didn’t “squeeze peasants” through surplus extraction, mobility restriction
  • peasants given property rights
  • agricultural revolution in England in 16th Century
  • rise of industrialized agriculture
  • widespread serfdom/slavery in colonies, but not at home

 

Why was Russia different? Was it?

 

Would Muscovy have kept expanding if it never allowed serfdom?


England

NEXT MEETING

 

Colonial Expansion and an Unstable Frontier (Tu, Sep. 12)

  • why Russia got so big
  • things to consider:
    • at what point did Russia become a “colonial empire”?
    • what strategies did Russia use to incorporate non-Slavic, non-Christian peoples into its growing empire?