Today’s objectives

 

  1. Define: insurgency and counterinsurgency
    1. Actors, goals, tactics
    2. Recent historical trends
  2. Consider: why insurgencies are so hard to defeat
    1. Several common explanations
    2. U.S. counterinsurgency field manual
  3. Case Study: Algerian War of Independence
    1. Brief history
    2. Galula, Trinquier and the origins of U.S. counterinsurgency doctrine

What is (Counter)Insurgency?

 

Insurgency:  

organized political violence by sub-state or non-state groups, directed against the agents of an incumbent government

 

includes:

  1. anti-occupational uprisings
  2. secessionist and revolutionary movements
  3. terrorist groups

excludes:

  1. unorganized political violence
    (“lone wolves”)
  2. organized crime
  3. riots and protests

objective:

  • change political status quo


 

 

Insurgents

 

Counterinsurgency:  

efforts by agents of an incumbent government to contain or defeat an insurgency

 

includes:

  1. army
  2. police
  3. foreign military forces
  4. pro-government militia
  5. contractors
  6. non-military agencies

excludes:

  1. deposed regime
  2. mutinies and coups

objective:

  • maintain political status quo


Counterinsurgents

 

Definitions of success  

  1. Insurgent success
    1. minimum: extraction of political concessions from government
    2. maximum: full attainment of political aims (e.g. independence, revolution)
  2. Counterinsurgent success
    1. minimum: denial of political concessions to insurgents
    2. maximum: neutralization of insurgent political and military organization

 

Remember: (Counter)insurgency is bargaining by other means

  • ultimate purpose of violence is to coerce, not to destroy the enemy

 

Like this, but more lopsided

 

How to gain bargaining leverage: popular support (or at least acquiescence)

  • information
  • taxes
  • labor
  • food & shelter
  • non-interference

Making rebellion costly

 

Popular support is a collective action problem for (counter)insurgents

  1. Insurgents need cooperation from a supportive public
  2. … but cooperation is individually costly for civilians
    1. cooperate with government \(\to\) retaliation by rebels
    2. cooperate with rebels \(\to\) retaliation by government
  3. Combatants secure cooperation with selective incentives (punish/reward)
  4. But it’s not easy to know who should be punished/rewarded
    1. indistinguishability of combatants from civilians
    2. reluctance of population to reveal combatants’ identities

Conventional war. Clear front lines, combatants easy to identify.

Irregular war. Combatants hide among civilians, hard to identify.

Asymmetric irregular war. One side easier to identify than other.

Explaining counterinsurgency success and failure

 

 

Puzzle of insurgency

  1. Power disparities should make war less likely
  2. Insurgents are (much) weaker than states
    1. Taliban: 25,000-50,000 troops
    2. Coalition: 500,000 troops (peak strength)
      \(+\) 50% world GDP
  3. Insurgencies are unfair fights
  4. So why are they becoming more frequent?
  5. And why are they becoming so much harder to defeat over time?


An unfair fight?

Why have (counter)insurgents become (less)more successful over time?

Success \(=\) conflict ends without major concessions by government

 

International level

  • Cold War
  • Decolonization
  • Interdependence
  • Globalization
  • Power vacuums

Domestic level

  • Democratization
  • Media
  • State failure
  • Normative changes
  • Social movements

Other?

  • __________

Battlefield level

  • Rules of engagement
  • Technology
  • Tactical innovation
  • Doctrine & strategy
  • Information
  • Mechanization

 

 

Field Manual 3-24

  1. Developed under GEN David Petraeus, USA
  2. Finalized Dec 2006
  3. Doctrinal basis for 2007 Iraq Surge

 

“Popular support allows counterinsurgents to develop the intelligence necessary to identify and defeat insurgents.”

 

– FM 3-24 (1:29)


FM 3-24

How to earn a population’s support?

Alternative approach FM 3-24
coercive violence vs. “hearts and minds”
attack enemy forces vs. defense of civilian population
small commando units vs. large conventional forces
military avoids civilian duties vs. military performs civilian duties
short-term, limited vs. long-term, costly

 

Theoretical basis for FM-3-24:

counterinsurgency “classics” of 1960’s (not contemporary civil war literature)

 

Empirical basis for FM-3-24:

Algerian War of Independence (not Vietnam)

Case Study: Algerian War of Independence

 

 

 

Historical context of the Algerian war

  1. Global wave of insurgencies in 1950-60s
  2. Mao’s “Protracted Popular War” strategy goes viral
    1. phase 1: prerevolutionary (underground organization)
    2. phase 2: strategic stalemate (guerrilla warfare)
    3. phase 3: strategic offensive (conventional warfare)
  3. Military leaders scrambling to develop response
  4. Two opposing views emerge:
    1. David Galula
    2. Roger Trinquier


 

FM-Mao

Background

 

 

Prewar history

  1. French conquer Algiers in 1830
  2. Algeria becomes part of metropolitan France (not a colony… technically)
  3. Large European settler population (Pied-Noir)
  4. Political, economic discrimination against native Arabs & Berbers
  5. French empire in collapse post-WWII


 

 

Pied-Noir

 

 

Front de Liberation National (FLN)

  1. FLN begins massive rebellion for independence
  2. Follows Mao’s PPW strategy in rural areas
  3. Urban guerrilla warfare in cities
  4. Campaign of terrorism & targeted killings vs. European settlers
  5. France sends 400,000 troops


 

 

Aftermath of FLN attack

 

 

France’s “counter-revolutionary struggle”

  1. Population control
  2. Forcible resettlement
  3. Psychological warfare
  4. Offensive operations
  5. Summary executions
  6. Collective reprisals
  7. Torture

Pied-Noirs also declare war

  1. Reprisals vs. native Algerians
  2. Terrorism against “soft” elements in French army & government


 

 

Paratroopers arrive

 

 

de Gaulle makes a deal

  1. By 1959, military campaign a success
  2. But no political breakthrough
  3. Growing domestic opposition to war
  4. President de Gaulle makes calls for “self-determination”, reaches out to FLN
  5. Algeria independent in 1962


 

 

Charles de Gaulle

Galula vs. Triquier

 

 

David Galula

  1. Born in French Algeria
  2. Served in China, Philippines, Hong Kong, Balkans
  3. Company commander in rural Kabylie region during war

Book: Pacification in Algeria (1963)

  1. Counterinsurgency means “building a political organization from the population upward”
  2. Population-centric war
  3. Insurgents start in weakness
  4. Counterinsurgents need local allies


 

 

David Galula

 

Galula in FM 3-24:
Clear-Hold-Build

  1. Eliminate insurgents
  2. Protect population
  3. Build government institutions
  4. Repeat

Goal: keep insurgents in “phase 1”

  1. Dismantle rebel institutions
  2. Deny rebels future material support from population
  3. Keep rebels incapable of major operations


 

 

Clearing is the easy part

 

 

Limitations of Galula’s approach

  1. Requires massive, long-term commitment
  2. Requires population control
  3. Asks army to take role of civilian government
  4. Focus on rural counterinsurgency

Some of Galula’s ideas are not in FM 3-24

  1. Immediate and public punishment of rebels
  2. Forcible resettlement of civilians


 

 

Mission creep?

 

 

Roger Trinquier

  1. Decade older than Galula
  2. Served in China, Indochina
  3. Intel chief of 10th Parachute Division in Algiers

Book: Modern Warfare (1961)

  1. Counterinsurgency means destroying the insurgents’ military organization
  2. Insurgents exploit “fiction of peace”
  3. Local police not up to task
  4. Civilian law too constraining
  5. Martial law is necessary


 

In real life

In Battle of Algiers

 

Trinquier in FM 3-24:
Human intelligence

  1. Mapping the “human terrain”
  2. Census, ID cards, checkpoints
  3. Intelligence collection on insurgent leadership, organization


 

 

Taking a census

 

Some of Trinquier’s ideas not in FM 3-24

  1. Torture
    1. once insurgent captured, his info only good for short time
    2. each piece of intel leads to more sweeps, more intel
    3. psychological impact on rebels
    4. civilians spontaneously cooperate during sweeps
  2. Coercion
    1. aggressive sweeps
    2. summary executions


 

 

The dark side