Russian-Ukrainian War in Context
War Makes the State
- Events of 2014 changed Ukraine & Russia
- Ukraine: political generation change, emerging pro-West consensus
- Russia: autocratic consolidation, diplomatic isolation, repression
- both: militarization of society
- Russia’s Imperial Syndrome (Lectures 2, 3)
- security from foreign threat requires strategic depth \(\to\) territorial conquest
- territorial conquest creates new political realities (e.g. new borders, new populations, new enemies)
- adapting to these “new realities” transforms state and society
(e.g. serfdom, colonialism, tyranny)
- legitimacy of political-economic status quo rests on foreign threat
Is “Military Victory” Possible?
What is “Military Victory”?
- Defining “victory” in war
- attainment of political aims for which one went to war
- can be obtained through force or coercive diplomacy
- Defining “military victory”
- imposition of political terms by rendering one’s enemy incapable of further resistance.
- can be obtained only through force
Pure “military victories” almost never happen
- Strategic level
- extremely rare for losing army to be fully (or mostly) destroyed in war
- Tactical level
- military formations are almost never fully annihilated in combat
Personnel losses in interstate wars since 1816
Almost all wars end before belligerents exhaust military potential
- loss rates higher for median war loser than for winner, but…
- most belligerents since 1816 lost less than 10% of armed forces
- median war participant lost 4.5% of overall force strength
Personnel losses in conventional ground battles since 1939
Most battles end before belligerents exhaust military potential
- high losses more common in battles than in wars, but…
- median battle participant lost only 14% of available forces
- loss rates not strongly predictive of strategic-level outcomes
How does this end?
- Ending war is a choice
- abstain/exit from combat
- continue to fight
- Bargaining model of war
- almost all military outcomes, at all levels of war, are choices that reflect (tacit) bargaining
- war begins if sides can’t reach deal
- fighting reveals information about capabilities & resolve, updating perceptions of bargaining leverage
- war ends when these perceptions yield agreement on terms of deal
- Purpose of violence
- establish credibility of threats
- … not to neutralize enemy’s capacity to continue fighting
Overview of Main Events
Eve of invasion
(Feb 23 2022)
- Russians occupy 7.5% of Ukraine’s territory
- Ukraine’s most capable units operating in JFO area (Donets’k, Luhans’k)
- static, defensive battles, artillery duels
- 14,200 casualties (most in 2014-2015)
Russia’s objective
- “demilitarization & denazification”
- translation:
- regime change
- (in)direct rule
Battle for Kyiv
(Feb-Mar 2022)
- Russians advance along four axes
(N, NE, SE, SW)
- supported by strikes against C2 & AAD
- goal: seize Kyiv, overthrow govt
- but plan based on flawed assumptions (no resistance)
- successes in south
- but northern front collapses
- 25% under Russian control (at peak)
Battle for Donbas
(Apr-Jul 2022)
- switch to more targeted campaign to capture Donbas
- Russians have 12:1 advantage in fires
- but territorial gains limited
- siege of Mariupol completed in May
- Lysychans’k and Sieverodonets’k captured in June/July
- 20.8% under Russian control (culmination)
Ukraine’s fall offensive
(Aug-Nov 2022)
- using local numerical advantage, Ukraine liberates most of Kharkiv oblast
- Kherson liberated in November
- Russia shifts to defensive posture
- Russia announces mobilization
- Russian strike campaign vs. critical infrastructure
- 18.2% under Russian control (culmination)
Russia’s winter offensive
(Jan-May 2023)
- limited to Donbas
- attempt to envelop Ukrainian forces from NE and S
- main efforts around Bakhmut, Svatove, Kreminna, Vuhledar, Avdiivka
- envelopment not achieved
- small territorial gains (around Bakhmut, Kupians’k)
- 18.3% under Russian control (culmination)
Ukraine’s 2023 offensive
(Jun-Oct 2023)
- three main axes: Melitopol, Berdyans’k, Bakhmut
- heavily fortified Russian positions, dynamic defense
- local Russian counteroffensive around Kupians’k
- breakthrough not achieved
- very small territorial gains (about 10 km)
- 18.3% under Russian control (culmination)
Russia’s long offensive
(Oct 2023 - )
- main axes: Pokrovs’k, Chasiv Yar, Kupians’k
- local pinning actions to divert Ukraine’s resources
- tactical adaptations: small-unit assaults by disposable convict infantry, integration of UAVs, fires, EW
- incremental Russian gains at high cost
- multiple local breakthroughs
- 19.6% under Russian control (current)