Today’s objectives

 

  1. Consider: how a wartime alliance turned into a global peacetime rivaly
  2. Take stock: how USSR tried to “catch up and overtake” USA
  3. Analyze: whether Cold War 1.0 was preventable

Sources of U.S.-Soviet Mistrust

The World in 1945


 

 

 

How did WWII end?

  1. Germany:
    1. Soviets in Berlin
    2. Hitler commits suicide
  2. Japan
    1. atomic bombs
    2. Soviet declaration of war

Immediate legacy of WWII

  1. destruction, rubble
  2. 65-85M dead
  3. collapse of German, Japanese
    puppet regimes
  4. collapse of colonial institutions
  5. global power vacuum


 

Pid zavalamy

Lost empire


 

 

 

Previous postwar settlements

  1. Congress of Vienna, 1815
    1. end of Napoleonic Wars
    2. 5 European great powers
      (Austria-Hungary, France, Russia, Prussia, UK)
  2. Paris Peace Conference, 1919
    1. end of WWI
    2. 2\(\frac{1}{2}\) European great powers
      (France, UK, Italy)
    3. 2 non-European powers
      (US, Japan)
    4. 2 missing great powers
      (Germany, USSR)


 

 

Vienna

Paris


 

 

 

What’s different about 1945?

  1. No peace conference
  2. Marginalization of Europe
    (UK ‘junior partner’ to US)
  3. 2 formerly peripheral powers now dominant
    (USA, USSR)
  4. No ‘grand’ postwar plans
  5. USA & USSR have starkly different views of world


 

Yalta

Potsdam


 

 

WWII legacy for Washington

  1. Relatively low costs of war
    1. \(\sim\) 405,000 casualties
      (1700 civilian)
    2. WWII not an existential struggle
    3. no full mobilization
    4. casualty avoidance
  2. Economic prosperity
    1. standard of living increased
    2. unemployment down
    3. wages, savings up
    4. industry eager to meet high global demand


 

Happy Days?


 

 

 

 

Postwar US interests

  1. Free trade
  2. Free movement of commerce
    (Atlantic Charter)
  3. Economic recovery in Europe
  4. Institutions for promotion of US interests around globe
    (United Nations)


 

 

World opportunity


 

 

WWII legacy for Moscow

  1. Extremely high costs of war
    1. 28M casualties
      (\(>\) 17M civilian)
    2. WWII \(=\) existential struggle
    3. total mobilization
    4. disregard for casualties
  2. Economic devastation
    1. damage to infrastructure
    2. damage to crops, factories
    3. major cities destroyed
    4. famine of 1946-47
    5. no post-WWII baby boom


 

 

Wrecked lives

Wrecked country


 

 

 

Postwar Soviet interests

  1. Security
  2. Security
  3. Security


 

 

Costliest victory

Allies in War, Enemies in Peace


 

 

Original Sin

  1. “Second front” in WWII
    1. Stalin presses for ‘second front’
      in June 1941
    2. but no allied landing in West Europe until June 1944
  2. Military reasons for delay
    1. strategic emphasis on Mediterranean, N Africa
    2. lack of landing craft, forces for cross-channel invasion
    3. US casualty sensitivity,
      domestic politics


 

 

Alone together


 

 

Soviet perceptions of delay

  1. “Let them destroy each other”
    1. military reasons are b.s.
    2. real reasons are political
    3. prewar conflicts with West
      • US, UK intervention in Russian Civil War, 1918
      • US doesn’t recognize USSR until 1933
      • anticommunism in US, UK
    4. US wartime aid (Lend Lease)
    5. but US, UK still seen as “free riding” on Soviet war effort


 

 

Better late never


 

 

Help wanted Position filled

  1. After Normandy
    1. by 1944, Soviets believe they can defeat Germany alone
  2. Red Army in 1945
    1. 11.3M troops
    2. 24,500 tanks
    3. mastery of offensive warfare
    4. “unstoppable” march to Berlin
  3. Military consequence of delay
    1. Soviets occupy most of Central, East Europe
    2. Soviets first to reach Berlin


 

 

We got this

Really, we’re good

Fighting the Cold War

Origins of Containment


 

 

Soviet-occupied Europe in 1946-1947

  1. Baltics \(\to\) USSR
  2. Koenigsberg \(\to\) Kaliningrad, USSR
  3. East Poland \(\to\) USSR
  4. East Prussia \(\to\) Poland
  5. Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria \(\to\) communist
  6. Yugoslavia, Albania \(\to\) communist
  7. Greece \(\to\) civil war


 

 

A new map


 

 

A New Order

  1. What comes next?
    1. Soviet security calls for ‘buffer zone’ in Europe
    2. democratic governments in CE Europe \(\neq\) pro-Soviet governments in CE Europe
    3. debate in West: is Soviet behavior driven by security or ideology?
  2. Stalin’s speech to voters, 1946
    1. blames WWII on capitalism
    2. any bargains with capitalist states “bound to fail”


 

 

What he want?


 

 

Kennan’s Long Telegram

  1. What kind of state is USSR?
    1. is USSR capable of reaching bargains, sticking to them?
    2. Kennan: ‘no’
  2. ‘Sources of Soviet Conduct’
    1. Soviet insecurity has domestic, not external causes
    2. external threat needed to justify domestic repression
    3. insatiable desire for security
    4. no grand bargains possible


 

 

George Kennan


 

 

Solution: containment

  1. Third Way (not war, not appeasement)
    1. ends: prevent future spread of Soviet power
    2. means: long-term, inter-generational policy of containing USSR
  2. Translation into policy
    1. NSC-68: global containment
      (challenge USSR everywhere)
    2. Eisenhower/Dulles: “rollback”
      (reverse Soviet gains, not just prevent them)
    3. Kennan was critical of both


 

 

Bipolar world


 

Solving the German problem

  1. German sovereignty dissolves
  2. 4 occupational zones
    (Soviet, US, UK, French)
  3. Allies divided over how these zones should be managed

Fissures form

  1. US interests
    1. fear that communism will spread
    2. US interest in prosperous, pro-Western regimes
    3. German economic recovery essential to US plan
  2. Soviet interests
    1. German recovery anathema to Soviet interests
    2. Stalin wants Germany weakened, incapable of action vs. neighbors


 

Germany, 1945

Bear hug


 

 

Origins of NATO, Warsaw Pact

  1. Timeline
    1. 1948: German currency crisis
    2. 1948: USSR blockades Berlin
    3. 1949: NATO established
    4. 1955: W Germany joins NATO
    5. 1955: Soviet Union forms Warsaw Pact with aligned countries


 

 

Europe, 1955


 

What if?

 

The Cold War could have been prevented if…

  1. Operation Overlord (D-Day landings in Normandy) had occurred in 1942 instead of 1944.
  2. There was a clear Soviet-American wartime agreement on the postwar partition of Germany.
  3. The U.S. had given Stalin an ultimatum in 1946: “Get out of Eastern Europe or we’ll throw you out!”
  4. Stalin was overthrown and replaced by a different Soviet leader.
  5. No, it’s impossible. The world’s two strongest powers will always compete for security.

 

Soviet Military Organization


 

 

Fighting the ‘Long War’

  1. Soviet challenges
    1. USSR enters Cold War with major disadvantages
    2. WWII economic devastation
    3. lower economic development
    4. lower troop quality
    5. political system that stifles initiative, innovation
    6. multiple insurgencies at home
  2. Soviet military model
    1. adopted by communist bloc, many developing states
    2. still common in ex-USSR, China, Africa, Arab states


 

 

Marching forward


 

Command and Control

  1. highly centralized
  2. highly detailed orders
    (opposite of German approach)
  1. Advantages
    1. ‘coup-proof’
    2. cuts costs in training, communication
  2. Disadvantages
    1. little flexibility
    2. underdeveloped NCO corps


 

Brass


 

Economic Strategy

  1. Permanent war economy
    1. ensure rational, serial production
    2. prioritize heavy industry
    3. underinvestment in light industry, consumer goods
    4. defense spending at 15-30% of GDP (US: 5-12 percent of GDP)
  2. Other cost-savings
    1. low-maintenance equipment
    2. stockpiling munitions
    3. investment in smaller navy ships, cruise missiles


 

Guns vs. butter


 

 

 

Catch Up and Overtake USA!

  1. Soviet military power
    1. maintained active peacetime force of 2.6 - 6M troops
    2. additional 20M+ in reserve
  2. Soviet-US balance in 1985
    1. 1.6:1 advantage in ballistic missiles
    2. 4:1 advantage in tanks
    3. 2.5:1 advantage in vehicles
    4. 5:1 advantage in artillery
    5. 1.1:1 advantage in aircraft
    6. 2.4:1 advantage in warships


 

Race is on


Taking stock: did the Soviets “catch up and overtake”?

Mil personnel

Population

Iron & steel

Urbanization

Mil spending

CINC score


 

Discussion:

 

Was the Soviets’ emphasis on “guns not butter” the right strategy?

 

Would the Soviets’ numerical advantage have mattered in a “hot war”?


NEXT MEETING

 

Nuclear Weapons and Strategy (Th, Nov. 7)

Thinking about the unthinkable.

  • Why did the Cold War stay ‘cold’?
  • Is limited nuclear war possible?
  • How did the Soviets’ understanding of nuclear deterrence differ from the U.S.?