Today’s objectives
- Evaluate: importance of balance of power in ground warfare
- Discuss: Soviet strategy heading into the Winter War
- Analyze: decisive factors in conduct/outcome of Winter War
Balance of Power in War
Predictors of victory and defeat in battle (from last lecture)
| numbers |
doctrine |
distance |
surprise |
weather |
| replacement of losses |
strategy |
terrain |
intelligence |
timing |
| industry/production |
training |
climate |
analysis |
luck |
| logistics |
officer quality |
roads |
communication |
|
| natural resources |
technology |
fortifications |
|
|
Long Term vs. Short Term Balance
Element of power: Productive capacity
- Benefits
- absorb costs of mistakes
- replace losses
- accumulate superiority in numbers
- Requirements
- time to mobilize resources
- access to raw materials
- access to capital goods
- standardized production
- serial manufacture
- assembly line, automation
- ability to utilize unskilled labor
Example: USSR
- Economic realities
- virtually self-sufficient
- mostly unaffected by opportunity cost of lost trade
- low procurement, O&M costs
- economy already militarized
- large population, territory
- Political realities
- central planning
- few political shocks from declining consumer economy
- less vulnerable to friction with industry
Example: Germany
- Economic realities
- reliance on imports (esp. energy)
- difficulty extracting resources from occupied territories
- limited labor & materials
- no mobilization plans for many industries
- higher O&M costs for equipment
- factories in Allied bomber range
- Political realities
- limits on rearmament until 1933
- inter-ministry (and inter-service) competition for resources and control of production
- frequent duplication of effort
- friction between industry & military
- uncertainty over extent of Hitler’s ambitions
USSR vs. Germany
Soviet victory seems inevitable, at least in the long term…
but what if there is no “long term”?
Balance of Power in 1939
Balance of power in 1939: Demographics
| USSR |
170,315,000 |
| USA |
131,028,000 |
| Germany |
79,798,000 |
| Japan |
71,380,000 |
| UK |
47,762,000 |
| Italy |
44,020,000 |
| France |
41,900,000 |
| Poland |
35,486,000 |
| Finland |
3,700,000 |
| Lithuania |
2,710,000 |
| Latvia |
1,990,000 |
| Estonia |
1,141,000 |
| UK |
39 |
| Germany |
30 |
| USA |
29 |
| Japan |
29 |
| USSR |
21 |
| Latvia |
20 |
| Italy |
19 |
| Estonia |
15 |
| France |
15 |
| Poland |
11 |
| Finland |
8 |
| Lithuania |
4 |
Balance of power in 1939: Military
| Germany |
2,750,000 |
| USSR |
1,789,000 |
| Japan |
957,000 |
| Italy |
581,000 |
| France |
581,000 |
| UK |
394,000 |
| USA |
334,000 |
| Poland |
275,000 |
| Finland |
37,000 |
| Latvia |
29,000 |
| Lithuania |
27,000 |
| Estonia |
15,000 |
| Germany |
12,000,000,000 |
| UK |
7,895,671,000 |
| USSR |
5,984,123,000 |
| Japan |
1,699,970,000 |
| France |
1,023,651,000 |
| USA |
980,000,000 |
| Poland |
968,472,000 |
| Italy |
669,412,000 |
| Finland |
68,491,000 |
| Lithuania |
11,230,000 |
| Latvia |
8,432,000 |
| Estonia |
5,123,000 |
Balance of power in 1939: Industry
| USA |
47,898 |
| Germany |
23,733 |
| USSR |
17,564 |
| UK |
13,433 |
| France |
7,950 |
| Japan |
6,696 |
| Italy |
2,283 |
| Poland |
504 |
| Finland |
77 |
| Latvia |
2 |
| Lithuania |
0 |
| Estonia |
0 |
Balance of power in 1939: Composite Index of National Capability
| USA |
0.182 |
| Germany |
0.178 |
| USSR |
0.138 |
| UK |
0.100 |
| Japan |
0.059 |
| France |
0.040 |
| Italy |
0.027 |
| Poland |
0.018 |
| Finland |
0.002 |
| Latvia |
0.001 |
| Lithuania |
0.001 |
| Estonia |
0.001 |
- Why sign non-aggression pact with Nazi Germany?
- Why annex these territories instead of neutral “buffer”?
Winter War
Political context
- pre-1939: neutral states in Baltic and Scandinavia
- Fall 1939: USSR stations troops, annexes Baltic States
- Soviet interests in Finland:
- access to Baltic Sea
- security of Leningrad
- security of Murmansk
- USSR offers land swap
(10 percent of Finland’s territory)
- Finland makes counteroffer
(partial concession on isthmus)
- USSR refuses, negotiations stop
Geography
- Distance
- 1300km shared border
- 400km Leningrad to Helsinki
- Terrain
- 1000s of lakes, bodies of water
- thick pine forests
- Climate
- sub-Arctic climate
- winter conditions
- Roads
- very few paved roads
- even fewer multi-lane roads
- Fortifications
- Mannerheim Line on Karelian Isthmus
Soviet Plans
Soviet War Plans
Desired end state:
- Regime change
- remove Mannerheim from power
- install Soviet puppet government
(“Finnish Democratic Republic”)
- Secure territorial concessions
- Karelian Isthmus
- Baltic Islands
- far north
Options:
- Shaposhnikov Plan
- concentrated attack
- narrow front
- Voroshilov Plan
- attack everywhere
- wide front
- short duration (12 days)
Discussion:
- Which plan would you have chosen?
- Which plan appealed more to Stalin, and why?
Plans Meet Reality
Reference guide to military map unit symbols (ground warfare)
| \(\bullet\) |
Squad |
8-15 |
Sergeant |
| \(\bullet\bullet\bullet\) |
Platoon |
20-60 |
2nd/1st Lieutenant |
| I |
Company |
100-250 |
Captain/Major |
| II |
Battalion |
500-600 |
Lt Colonel |
| III |
Regiment |
1,000-3,000 |
Colonel |
| X |
Brigade |
3,000-5,000 |
Colonel/Brigadier |
| XX |
Division |
10,000-20,000 |
Maj General |
| XXX |
Corps |
40,000-100,000 |
Lt General |
| XXXX |
Army |
200,000-500,000 |
General |
| XXXXX |
Army Group |
500,000-1,000,000 |
Field Marshal |
Order of Battle, December 1939
Soviet Union
- Numbers
- 760K troops
- 2300 tanks
- 2500 aircraft
- Force structure
- 6 armored divisions
- 24 infantry divisions
- organized into 5 armies:
- 7th (isthmus)
- 13th (isthmus)
- 8th (south)
- 9th (center)
- 14th (north)
Finland
- Numbers
- 250K troops
- 30 tanks
- 130 aircraft
- Force structure
- 10 infantry divisions
- organized into 2 armies,
1 corps, smaller units
- Kannas (isthmus)
- Mannerheim (south)
- IV Corps (south)
- ind. companies, battalions (north/center)
Phase I (Nov 30 - Jan 6)
- North
- 80:1 Soviet advantage in #s
- Soviets quickly capture beachhead
- Center
- 9th Army struggles to advance
(eg. Suomussalmi)
- Isthmus & South
- largest grouping of Soviet forces
- main effort on Karelian isthmus
(slow progress)
- secondary effort above Lake Ladoga
Phase II (Jan 6 - Mar 1)
- Change of command
- Voroshilov replaced by Tymoshenko as NKO (MOD)
- Shaposhnikov given full operational command
- Change of strategy
- Shaposhnikov plan put in effect
- Breakthrough
- Red Army breaches Line, establishes beachhead in Viipuri
- Finns ask for armistice
- agree to original Soviet
territorial demands
The toll (killed, wounded, captured)
- USSR: 447,444
- Finland: 70,461
- 1:6 loss-exchange ratio
What was decisive in the Winter War? (and what wasn’t?)
| numbers |
doctrine |
distance |
surprise |
weather |
| replacement of losses |
strategy |
terrain |
intelligence |
timing |
| industry/production |
training |
climate |
analysis |
luck |
| logistics |
officer quality |
roads |
communication |
|
| natural resources |
technology |
fortifications |
|
|
- Balance of power
(Soviet advantage)
- 3:1 advantage in personnel
- 76:1 advantage in tanks
- 19:1 advantage in aircraft
- Finland had 21 days of ammo
- Soviets packed 12 days worth
(but they had more back home)
- Force employment
(Finnish advantage)
- Soviet officer purges stifled initiative
- Soviet “hold your ground” doctrine quickly wasted ammo
- Finnish emphasis on tactical improvisation
- Geography
(Finnish advantage)
- Mannerheim Line
- excellent defensive terrain
- dense pine forests
- limited roads, mobility
- no Soviet mobility off road
- Information
(Finnish advantage)
- Finnish knowledge of local terrain
- Finnish knowledge of Soviet/Russian army
- Chance
(Finnish advantage?)
- coldest winter in 30 years
- frozen truck, tank engines
- frostbitten soldiers
NEXT MEETING
USSR at War: Barbarossa to Moscow (Tu, Oct. 28)
- why was USSR so unprepared for Germany’s invasion?
- how did ideology impact conduct of war, rules of engagement?
- what prevented the Red Army from collapsing?