

Russian Security State

GOVT-5519 / IPOL-3519 / REES-5519

Lecture 12. The Long-Term Legacy of Violence

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Today's objectives

1. *Discuss*: role of time horizons in policy analysis
2. *Follow up*: what happened (many years) after NKVD resettlement in Western Ukraine and Great Terror
3. *Consider*: how behavioral legacies of violence can change

Time Horizons

Cost and benefit streams

How a policy's **costs** and **benefits** might unfold over time




Figure 1: Early peak




Figure 2: Late surge

How a policy's **costs** and **benefits** might unfold over time




Figure 3: Middle hump



Figure 4: "Bathtub"

Which policy would you choose?




Figure 5: Option A




Figure 6: Option B

Which policy would you choose?




Figure 7: Option A (net utility)




Figure 8: Option B (net utility)

Which policy would you choose?




Figure 9: Option A




Figure 10: Option C

Which policy would you choose?




Figure 11: Option A (net utility)




Figure 12: Option C (net utility)

Discounting

What is discounting?

relative value of things now vs. in the future

“discounting our payoffs” means payoffs received today are more valuable than payoffs received in future

Discussion:

- a) how do short vs. long time horizons impact evaluation of cost/benefit streams?
- b) do dictators necessarily have longer time horizons than democrats?
- c) how might discounting explain Soviet/Russian strategy choice in repression and counter-insurgency?



Figure 13: Future overrated

Long-Term Political Legacy of Violence

What happens next?

Long-term effect of NKVD resettlement in Western Ukraine

- more Soviet-era repression → less support for Moscow today




Figure 14: Effect of NKVD/MVD deportations on pro-Moscow vote margin
("Pro-Moscow" parties: Party of Regions, Communists, Opposition Bloc)

Long-term effect of NKVD's **Great Terror in Russia**

- more Soviet-era repression → less support for Putin today




Figure 15: Effect of NKVD arrests on incumbent vote share

Long-term effect of NKVD's **Great Terror in Russia**

- more Soviet-era repression → more opposition support today




Figure 16: Effect of NKVD arrests on Liberal vote share

Long-term effect of NKVD's **Great Terror in Russia**

- more Soviet-era repression → less political participation today




Figure 17: Effect of NKVD arrests on electoral turnout

How legacies change over time

Behavioral legacy of violence is **contingent** on threat of new violence

1. When threat of renewed repression is *credible*:
 - past repression *increases* behavioral loyalty
(preference falsification, "keep your head down")
(political attitudes \neq political behavior)
2. When threat of renewed repression is *not credible*:
 - past repression *decreases* behavioral loyalty
(political attitudes = political behavior)

Famine and political behavior in Ukraine, 1941-2017





Figure 18: Excess mortality from famine



Period	Threat	Outcome	Expectation
1941-1944	variable	opposition to Red partisans	↑ opposition
1946-1958	high	anti-Soviet votes	↓ opposition
1987-1991	variable	anti-Soviet protests	↑ opposition
2002-2014	absent	anti-Russian votes	↑ opposition
2009-2013	absent	anti-Yanukovych protests	↑ opposition
2017	variable	opposition to pro-Russia separatists	↑ opposition



Opposition to Soviet Partisans

1. *Soviet coercive threat*: variable
2. *Effect of famine*: ↑ opposition (i.e. less partisan support, activity)
3. *Data*: partisan territorial control, base camps and anti-German operations



Figure 19: Red partisans



Protest votes

1. *Soviet coercive threat*: high
2. *Effect of famine*: ↓ opposition (i.e. less "against all" vote)
3. *Data*: Supreme Soviet elections in 1946, 1950, 1954, 1958





Figure 20: One man one vote



Anti-Soviet protests

1. *Soviet coercive threat*: variable
2. *Effect of famine*: ↑ opposition (i.e. more protests)
3. *Data*: anti-Soviet protests, 1987-1992



Figure 21: Winds of change



Anti-Russian vote share

1. *Soviet coercive threat*: absent
2. *Effect of famine*: ↑ opposition (i.e. less pro-Russian vote)
3. *Data*: Ukrainian national elections in 2004, 2006, 2007, 2010, 2012, 2014



Figure 22: Holosuy proty




Anti-Yanukovych protests

1. *Soviet coercive threat*: absent
2. *Effect of famine*: ↑ opposition (i.e. more protests)
3. *Data*: Ukrainian street protests in 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013



Figure 23: Bandu het'



Opposition to pro-Russian rebels

1. *Soviet coercive threat*: variable
2. *Effect of famine*: ↑ opposition (i.e. more opposition)
3. *Data*: field survey in Donbas, 2017




Figure 24: Stukach 2.0

Discussion:

- a) What are the implications of these patterns for cost/benefit flows of repression over time?
- b) Is “generational trauma” real? What are the mechanisms for its inter-generational transmission?
- c) Is it possible to “win back” victimized people without coercion?

NEXT MEETING

Group Presentations! (Th, Oct. 17)

- prepare 5-6 slides addressing points in the prompt
- 15 minutes: 10 minute briefing + 5 minute Q&A
- presentations in same order as in prompt (1, 2, 3, 4)