Today’s objectives

 

  1. Discuss: role of time horizons in policy analysis
  2. Follow up: what happened (many years) after NKVD resettlement in Western Ukraine and Great Terror
  3. Consider: how behavioral legacies of violence can change

Time Horizons

Cost and benefit streams

How a policy’s costs and benefits might unfold over time

 

Early peak

Late surge

How a policy’s costs and benefits might unfold over time

 

Middle hump

“Bathtub”

Which policy would you choose?

 

Option A

Option B

Which policy would you choose?

 

Option A (net utility)

Option B (net utility)

Which policy would you choose?

 

Option A

Option C

Which policy would you choose?

 

Option A (net utility)

Option C (net utility)

Discounting

What is discounting?
relative value of things now vs. in the future

 

“discounting our payoffs” means payoffs received today are more valuable than payoffs received in future

 

Discussion:

  1. how do short vs. long time horizons impact evaluation of cost/benefit streams?
  2. do dictators necessarily have longer time horizons than democrats?
  3. how might discounting explain Soviet/Russian strategy choice in repression and counter-insurgency?


 

 

 

Future overrated

Long-Term Political Legacy of Violence

What happens next?

Long-term effect of NKVD resettlement in Western Ukraine

  • more Soviet-era repression \(\to\) less support for Moscow today

Effect of NKVD/MVD deportations on pro-Moscow vote margin

(“Pro-Moscow” parties: Party of Regions, Communists, Opposition Bloc)

Long-term effect of NKVD’s Great Terror in Russia

  • more Soviet-era repression \(\to\) less support for Putin today

Effect of NKVD arrests on incumbent vote share

Long-term effect of NKVD’s Great Terror in Russia

  • more Soviet-era repression \(\to\) more opposition support today

Effect of NKVD arrests on Liberal vote share

Long-term effect of NKVD’s Great Terror in Russia

  • more Soviet-era repression \(\to\) less political participation today

Effect of NKVD arrests on electoral turnout

How legacies change over time

Behavioral legacy of violence is contingent on threat of new violence

  1. When threat of renewed repression is credible:
    • past repression increases behavioral loyalty
      (preference falsification, “keep your head down”)
      (political attitudes \(\neq\) political behavior)
  2. When threat of renewed repression is not credible:
    • past repression decreases behavioral loyalty
      (political attitudes \(=\) political behavior)

Famine and political behavior in Ukraine, 1941-2017

Excess mortality from famine

Period Threat Outcome Expectation
1941-1944 variable opposition to Red partisans \(\uparrow\) opposition
1946-1958 high anti-Soviet votes \(\downarrow\) opposition
1987-1991 variable anti-Soviet protests \(\uparrow\) opposition
2002-2014 absent anti-Russian votes \(\uparrow\) opposition
2009-2013 absent anti-Yanukovych protests \(\uparrow\) opposition
2017 variable opposition to pro-Russia separatists \(\uparrow\) opposition

 

 

 

 

Opposition to Soviet Partisans

  1. Soviet coercive threat: variable
  2. Effect of famine: \(\uparrow\) opposition
    (i.e. less partisan support, activity)
  3. Data: partisan territorial control, base camps and anti-German operations


 

Red partisans

 

 

 

 

Protest votes

  1. Soviet coercive threat: high
  2. Effect of famine: \(\downarrow\) opposition
    (i.e. less “against all” vote)
  3. Data: Supreme Soviet elections in 1946, 1950, 1954, 1958


 

One man one vote

 

 

 

Anti-Soviet protests

  1. Soviet coercive threat: variable
  2. Effect of famine: \(\uparrow\) opposition
    (i.e. more protests)
  3. Data: anti-Soviet protests, 1987-1992


 

Winds of change

 

 

 

Anti-Russian vote share

  1. Soviet coercive threat: absent
  2. Effect of famine: \(\uparrow\) opposition
    (i.e. less pro-Russian vote)
  3. Data: Ukrainian national elections in 2004, 2006, 2007, 2010, 2012, 2014


 

Holosuy proty

 

 

 

 

Anti-Yanukovych protests

  1. Soviet coercive threat: absent
  2. Effect of famine: \(\uparrow\) opposition
    (i.e. more protests)
  3. Data: Ukrainian street protests in 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013


Bandu het’

 

 

 

 

Opposition to pro-Russian rebels

  1. Soviet coercive threat: variable
  2. Effect of famine: \(\uparrow\) opposition
    (i.e. more opposition)
  3. Data: field survey in Donbas, 2017


 

Stukach 2.0

 

 

 

 

Discussion:

  1. What are the implications of these patterns for cost/benefit flows of repression over time?
  2. Is “generational trauma” real? What are the mechanisms for its inter-generational transmission?
  3. Is it possible to “win back” victimized people without coercion?

NEXT MEETING

 

Group Presentations! (Th, Oct. 16)

  • 3-5 minutes per group
  • presentations in same order as in prompt