Russian Security State

GOVT-5519 / IPOL-3519 / REES-5519 Lecture 11. State Security Services

> Yuri M. Zhukov Associate Professor Georgetown University

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Today's objectives

- 1. Identify: missions and priorities of security services
- 2. Distinguish: group vs. individual administrative procedures
- 3. Discuss: post-Soviet and Putin-era reforms to secret police



Figure 1: Where are we?



Figure 2: Lubyanka #2

Group targeting: Resettlement in Western Ukrain ndividual targeting: Great Terror

Cheka to KGB

Alphabet soup of state security

- 1. 1917-1922: All-Russian Extraordinary Commission (VChK, or Cheka)
- 1922-1923: State Political Directorate (GPU) within People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs (NKVD)
- 1923-1934: Joint State Political Directorate (OGPU) within Council of People's Commissars (SNK)
- 4. 1934-1943: Main Directorate for State Security (GUGB) in NKVD
- 5. 1941: NKVD split into People's Commissariats for Internal Affairs (NKVD) and State Security (NKGB)
- 6. 1941-1943: NKGB and NKVD re-merged into NKVD
- 7. 1943-1946: NKVD re-split into NKGB, NKVD
- 8. 1946-1954: People's Commissariats renamed Ministries of Internal Affairs (MVD), State Security (MGB)
- 9. 1954-1991: Committee for State Security (KGB)
- 10. 1991-1993: KGB split into Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR), Main Administration of Protection (GUO), Ministry of Security (MB)
- 11. 1993-1995: MB becomes Federal Counterintelligence Service (FSK)
- 12. 1995-Now: FSK becomes Federal Security Service (FSB)

Yuri M. Zhukov

Mission:

preserve, protect Russian (Soviet) regime

 investigate, arrest, punish, deter all those who "threaten the [public] order"

Command and control

- Act on orders from supreme political authorities (TsIK, Politburo, President)
- Broad local discretion to interpret/implement orders

Mandate

- 1. State security functions
- 2. Administration of camps $(\rightarrow FSIN)$
- 3. Counterintelligence
- 4. Border control
- 5. Fire service
- 6. Civil policing
- 7. Protection of state leaders $(\rightarrow FSO)$



Figure 3: Goyda!

Who was repressed in this way?

"Socially malign" actors

- 1. Foreign agents (suspected)
 - a) persons educated abroad
 - b) persons with family abroad
 - c) persons with contacts abroad
 - d) POWs from WWI, WWII
 - e) political immigrants
 - f) members of national diasporas
- 2. Political rivals (perceived)
 - a) those who served Tsarist regime
 - b) former Whites
 - c) Mensheviks, SRs, Trotskyites
- 3. Class enemies
 - a) cultural elites (clergy, academia)
 - b) economic elites (kulaks, merchants)
- 4. Marginalized groups
 - a) criminals, sex workers, "vagrants"



Figure 4: All enemies

Shifting repression priorities

- 1. 1917-1923
 - a) members of former ruling class
 - b) cultural elites
 - c) Cossacks
- 2. 1923-1934
 - a) religious elites
 - b) opponents of collectivization
 - c) political rivals
- 3. 1934-1938
 - a) political and military elite
 - b) ethnic groups with "foreign ties"
- 4. 1939-1953
 - a) residents of western borderlands
 - b) ethnic groups who "collaborated"
 - c) returning POWs, enslaved workers
 - d) Jews
- 5. Throughout
 - a) second-hand repression (children, families of repressed)



Figure 5: Iron Feliks

How to target "enemies"

- 1. Individual basis
 - a) follow standard investigative, (quasi-)judicial proceedings
 - b) separate criminal case in each arrest
 - c) specific charges filed
 - d) extensive case documentation
 - e) note: individual \neq selective
- 2. Group basis
 - a) large administrative proceeding
 - b) no individual cases or charges
 - c) no or little paper trail



Figure 6: "Due process"

Group targeting: Resettlement in Western Ukraine

Background: Western Ukraine

1. **1919-1921**:

Ukraine split between Poland (Galicia, Volhynia), Soviet Union (center, east)

2. **1929**:

Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN) forms in Poland

3. **1939-1941**:

Soviets occupy West Ukraine, OUN splits into moderate (OUN-m) and militant (OUN-b) factions

4. **1941**:

OUN-b declares Ukraine independence, Germans crack down on OUN-b

5. **1942**:

OUN-b forms Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA) to counter Soviet partisans

6. **1944-1955**:

Soviets re-occupy Ukraine, start long counter-insurgency vs. UPA



Figure 7: NKVD-VV unit



Figure 8: OUN-UPA cell




Figure 9: 1943

- Fighting starts when country still under German occupation.
- UPA launches campaign vs. suspected Soviet collaborators.




Figure 10: 1944

- Campaign reaches peak in 1944-1945, when Soviets return.
- Soviets, starved of intelligence, rely on indiscriminate violence.




Figure 11: 1945

- NKVD begins campaign of mass population resettlement.
- Resettlement ostensibly targets families, supporters of UPA members.




Figure 12: 1946

- To keep up with quotas, resettlement becomes more indiscriminate.
- "Without discrimination, they grab children, women, the elderly..."




Figure 13: 1947

- Suspected rebels' families represented 32-59% of resettled households in October 1947... Who were the other 41-68%?




Figure 14: 1948

- UPA insurgency goes on, at lower intensity
- Soviets briefly pause resettlement program.




Figure 15: 1949

- Soviets' collectivization of local farms sparks renewed resistance, renewed campaign of resettlement.




Figure 16: 1950

- By 1950, the conflict had become low-intensity.
- Soviets had mostly established monopoly on use of force.




Figure 17: 1943-1955

- Heavy toll: 266,000 resettled, 127,000 killed.
- How decisive was forcible resettlement in reducing insurgent violence?

Did resettlement work?

1. Yes

- a) resettlement had significant suppressive effect on UPA violence
- b) expected number of attacks decreased by 47% on average

2. And

- a) removal of local popular base changed how UPA fought
- b) UPA violence became less selective, more indiscriminate
- 3. But (discussion)
 - a) was it worth the cost?
 - b) why didn't NKVD care if they were deporting rebels or civilians?
 - c) was there anything outside powers could have done to stop this?



Figure 18: Everyone out



Figure 19: All aboard

Cheka to KGB Group targeting: Resettlement in Western Uke-Soviet reforms Individual targeting: Great Terror

Individual targeting: Great Terror




Figure 20: Political arrests in Soviet Union per year. Stalin's rule in red.

Mass repression, in 10 fast steps

- 1. Political leadership (Kremlin)
 - approve orders, quotas (e.g. Order 00447, 1937)
- 2. State Security HQ (Center)
 - relay instructions, regional quotas to each Region
- 3. Regional Directorates (Region)
 - send more specific orders, quotas to each District
- 4. District Branches (District)
 - fill quota!
 - identify suspects
 - investigate suspects
 - detain, interrogate, obtain confessions
 - prepare charging documents for Region

- 5. Region
 - review charging documents from District
 - prepare list for Center
- 6. Center
 - collate master list
- 7. Kremlin
 - (pre-)approve master list
- 8. Center
 - send regional lists
- Region
 - send regional list for expedited judicial review (VKVS, Troikas)
 - no witnesses, no attorneys, no appeals
- 10. District
 - carry out sentences

Evidentiary standard

where to find "counter-revolutionaries"?

- District database (kartoteka)
 - a) grouped by employer, party, class, nationality, family history
 - b) initially used to pick suspects
 - but databases too small to keep up with volume, pace of quotas
- 2. Factory lists
 - a) to supplement database
- 3. "Snowball" method
 - a) ask suspects to name "co-conspirators"
- 4. Simplified investigative procedures
 - a) group arrests, "easy" charges
 - b) back-date arrest warrants, with "evidence" collected after arrest
 - c) signed confession becomes sufficient for conviction

ДОПРОС ДЕТЕЙ "ВРЯГОВ НЯРОДЯ" О КОНТРРЕВОЛЮ-ЦИОННОЙ ДЕЯТЕЛЬНОСТИ ИХ РОДИТЕЛЕЙ И БЛИЗКИХ...



CRAMINGWARD CONTROL CO

Figure 21: Little eyes & ears

Security services under Yeltsin Security services under Putin

Post-Soviet reforms

Security services under Yeltsin Security services under Putin

Security services under Yeltsin




Figure 22: Dismemberment of KGB under Yeltsin

Security services under Yeltsin Security services under Putin

Security services under Putin

Putin renaissance

- 1. Leadership purge
 - a) Yeltsin-era agency heads replaced
- 2. FSB mission expands
 - a) Service for Defense of Constitutional Order \rightarrow FSB
 - b) border guards \rightarrow FSB
 - c) collection/operations in "near abroad" \rightarrow FSB
 - d) foreign intelligence \rightarrow FSB
 - e) operations abroad \rightarrow FSB
 - f) presidential briefings \rightarrow FSB
- 3. FSB capture of government agencies
 - a) FSB officers \rightarrow presidential administration
 - b) FSB officers → MOD leadership
 - c) FSB officers \rightarrow MVD leadership
 - d) FSB officers → FSKN leadership
 - e) FSB officers \rightarrow army morale



Figure 23: Back in black

Putin renaissance (continued)

- 4. FSB capture of other institutions
 - a) FSB \rightarrow Russian Orthodox Church
 - b) FSB \rightarrow state energy companies
 - c) FSB → telecommunications
 - d) FSB \rightarrow railroads

Inter-agency competition

- a) FSB vs. SVR (foreign collection)
- b) FSB vs. GRU (active measures)
- c) no national IC coordination/integration center (e.g. ODNI)
- d) no "National Intelligence Estimates"

Discussion:

- a) is the FSB more or less powerful now than it was under ComParty control?
- b) is the FSB still capable of state terror on a 1937 scale?




Figure 24: Goyda!!!

NEXT MEETING

Long-Term Legacy of Violence (Tu, Oct. 15)

- what happenes after the violence ends
- things to consider:
 - what trade-offs do you see between short-term and long-term political gains from repression?
 - is "generational trauma" real? what are the mechanisms of inter-generational transmission?