

Political Science 661
Proseminar in International Security and Conflict
11:00 AM - 2:00 PM, Tuesdays @ Mason Hall 2333

Instructor: Yuri M. Zhukov, Associate Professor of Political Science, zhukov@umich.edu

- Office Hours: T 3:00-6:00 PM.
Signup sheet (24 hours in advance): calendly.com/zhukov-umich

Course Description: This half-course examines the politics of international conflict and security, focusing on theories of interstate and civil war, terrorism, nuclear strategy and military effectiveness. This course is part of the World Politics proseminar sequence; prior elements of the sequence are not a prerequisite for subsequent elements.

This is a World Politics course.

Grade Policy: Grades will be based on weekly attendance and participation (40%), a research proposal (30%), and a class presentation (30%).

1. **Classroom participation** (40%). Students are expected to engage the readings fully and actively participate in all discussions and debates. In addition, each student will be asked to kick off the discussion on at least one group of assigned readings from the syllabus (topics will be selected and assigned on week 1).
2. **Research proposal** (30%). Students will prepare one 750-1000 word paper identifying a theoretical or empirical problem in a week's readings and a research question and preliminary design for addressing that problem. The proposals will be due (via Canvas) by 5:00 PM the day before we discuss those readings in class. The student should be prepared to discuss their proposal as part of our classroom discussion.
3. **Research marathon** (30%). The class will conclude with a "5-Minute Fiesta" style (or 10-minute, depending on enrollment) research marathon, in which each student will deliver a short presentation of an early-stage research project, based on the proposal submitted earlier in the class. The presentation should be brief and elevator-pitch style (2-slide maximum). Each presentation will be followed by a lightning round feedback session, in which other students will offer constructive feedback on how to develop the research project further.

Class Schedule

1. *Theories of War and Peace* Tuesday, Mar. 7
 - a) **Course Introduction**
 - b) **History of the Field**
 - Brian C. Schmidt, "On The History and Historiography of International Relations" in Walter Carlsnaes, Thomas Risse, Beth A. Simmons eds., *Handbook of International Relations* (Sage, 2012): 3-28.

Recommended:

- Peter J Katzenstein, Robert O. Keohane, and Stephen D. Krasner, “International Organization and the Study of World Politics,” *International Organization* 52, no. 4 (Autumn 1998): 645-685.
- Ole Waever, “The Sociology of a Not so International Discipline: American and European Developments in International Relations,” *International Organization* 52, no. 4 (Autumn 1998): 687-727.

c) **Structural Explanations of Interstate Conflict**

- Kenneth N. Waltz, *Theory of International Politics* (Reading: Addison-Wesley, 1979): 161-176.
- John Mearsheimer, “The False Promise of International Institutions,” *International Security* 19, no. 3 (1994-95): 5-49.
- Douglas Lemke, *Regions of War and Peace* (Cambridge University Press, 2002): Ch2
- Nuno P. Monteiro, “Unrest Assured: Why Unipolarity is Not Peaceful,” *International Security* 36, no. 3 (2012): 9-40.

Recommended:

- Robert Jervis, “Cooperation under the Security Dilemma,” *World Politics* 30, no. 2 (January 1978): 167-214.
- Stephen Van Evera, “Offense, Defense, and the Causes of War,” *International Security* (1998).
- Bear Braumoeller, “Systemic Politics and the Origins of Great Power Conflict,” *American Political Science Review* 102, no. 1 (2008): 1-17.
- Muhammet A. Bas and Robert J. Schub, “How uncertainty about war outcomes affects war onset,” *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 60, no. 6 (2016): 1099-1128.

Further reading:

- Jack Snyder, “One World, Rival Theories,” *Foreign Policy*, no. 145 (November/December 2004): 52-62.
- Stephen M. Walt, “International Relations: One World, Many Theories,” *Foreign Policy*, no. 110 (Spring 1998): 29-46.
- Michael Doyle, *Ways of War and Peace*, (New York: W.W. Norton, 1997): 205-12.
- Randall L. Schweller, “Bandwagoning for Profit: Bringing the Revisionist State Back In,” *International Security* 19 (Summer 1994): 72-107.
- Dale C. Copeland, “Economic Interdependence and War: A Theory of Trade Expectations,” *International Security* 20 (Spring 1996): 5-41.
- Jack S. Levy, “The Causes of War and the Conditions of Peace,” *Annual Review of Political Science*, Vol. 1 (1998), pp. 139-165.
- Robert Gilpin, *War and Change in World Politics* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1981): 156-210.
- Jack Donnelly, “The Elements of the Structures of International Systems,” *International Organization* 66, no. 4 (Fall 2012): 609-643.
- Robert Jervis, “Unipolarity: A Structural Perspective,” *World Politics* 61, no. 1 (2009): 188-213.

- Joshua D. Kertzer and Kathleen M. McGraw, “Folk Realism: Testing the Micro-foundations of Realism in Ordinary Citizens,” *International Studies Quarterly* 54, no. 2 (June 2012).
- Seva Gunitsky, “From Shocks to Waves: Hegemonic Transitions and Democratization in the Twentieth Century,” *International Organization* 68 (2014): 561-597.

2. *Rationalist Perspectives* Tuesday, Mar. 14

a) **Bargaining**

- Thomas Schelling. 1966. *Arms and Influence*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press: Chapters 1 and 2.
- James D. Morrow, “Capabilities, Uncertainty, and Resolve: A Limited Information Model of Crisis Bargaining,” *American Journal of Political Science* 33, no. 4. (November 1989): 941-972.
- James Fearon, “Rationalist Explanations for War,” *International Organization* 49 (Summer 1995): 379-414.
- Robert Powell, “War as a Commitment Problem,” *International Organization* 60 (2006): 169-203.

Recommended:

- James D. Morrow, “Signaling Difficulties with Linkage in Crisis Bargaining,” *International Studies Quarterly* 36, no. 2. (June 1992): 153-172.
- James Fearon, “Signaling versus the Balance of Power and Interests: An Empirical Test of a Crisis Bargaining Model.” *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 38 (1994): 236-269.
- Branislav Slantchev, “Feigning Weakness,” *International Organization* 64, no. 3 (2010): 357-388.
- Muhammet A. Bas and Robert Schub, “Peaceful uncertainty: When power shocks do not create commitment problems.” *International Studies Quarterly* 61, no. 4 (2017): 850-866.

Further reading:

- Robert Powell, *In the Shadow of Power* (Princeton University Press, 1999): Ch. 3-4.
- Erik Gartzke, “War is in the Error Term,” *International Organization* 53, no. 3 (1999): 567-587.
- Dan Reiter, “Exploring the Bargaining Model of War,” *Perspectives on Politics* 1 no. 1 (2003): 27-43.
- Alexandre Debs and Nuno Monteiro, “Known Unknowns: Power Shifts, Uncertainty, and War,” *International Organization* 68, no. 1 (2014) :1-31.

b) **Explaining Interstate Cooperation**

- Robert Axelrod, “The Emergence of Cooperation among Egoists,” *American Political Science Review* 75, no.2 (1981): 306-318.
- G. John Ikenberry, “Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Persistence of American Postwar Order,” *International Security* 23, no. 3 (1998):43-78.

Recommended:

- Robert O. Keohane, *After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy* (Princeton University Press, 1984): 5-11, 25-30.
- Brian Rathbun, “Before Hegemony: Generalized Trust and the Creation and Design of International Security Organizations,” *International Organization* 65, no. 2 (April 2011): 243-273.
- James Morrow, “Modeling the Forms of International Cooperation,” *International Organization* 48 (1994): 387-423.
- Andrew Kydd, “Which side are you on? Bias, credibility, and mediation,” *American Journal of Political Science* 47, no. 4 (2003): 597-611.

Further reading:

- Thomas Schelling, “What is Game Theory?” in *Choice and Consequence* (Harvard University Press, 1984): 213-242.
- James Fearon, “Bargaining, Enforcement and International Cooperation,” *International Organization* 52 (1998): 269-306.

3. ***Alternative Perspectives*** Tuesday, Mar. 21

a) **Psychological Approaches**

- Jack S. Levy, “Misperception and the Causes of War,” *World Politics* 36 (October 1983): 76-99.
- Dominic D. P. Johnson, *Overconfidence and War: The Havoc and Glory of Positive Illusions* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2004), 1-34.
- Jonathan Renshon, “Losing face and sinking costs: Experimental evidence on the judgment of political and military leaders,” *International Organization* 69, no. 3 (2015): 659-695.

Recommended:

- Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky, “Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision Under Risk,” *Econometrica* 47 (March 1979): 263-91.
- Jack S. Levy, “Prospect Theory, Rational Choice, and International Relations,” *International Studies Quarterly* 41 (March 1997): 87-112.
- Marcus Holmes, “The Force of Face-to-Face Diplomacy: Mirror Neurons and the Problem of Intentions,” *International Organization* 67, no. 4 (2013): 829-861.
- Jonathan Renshon, “Status deficits and war,” *International Organization* 70, no. 3 (2016): 513-550.

Further reading:

- Jack S. Levy, “Loss Aversion, Framing Effects, and International Conflict: Perspectives from Prospect Theory,” in *Handbook of War Studies II*, ed. Manus I. Midlarsky (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2000), 193-221.
- Jack S. Levy, “Organizational Routines and the Causes of War,” *International Studies Quarterly*, 30 (June 1986): 193-222.
- Rose McDermott, “The Feeling of Rationality: The Meaning of Neuroscientific Advances for Political Science,” *Perspectives on Politics* 2, no. 4 (December 2004): 691-706.

- Stephen Peter Rosen, *War and Human Nature* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005): 71-98.
- Richard Ned Lebow, “Fear, Honor, and Interest” in Richard Ned Lebow, *Cultural Theory of International Relations* (Cambridge, 2008): 43-121.

b) **Feminist Approaches**

- Mary Caprioli, “Gendered conflict,” *Journal of Peace Research* 37, no. 1 (2000): 51-68.
- Michael T. Koch and Sarah A. Fulton, “In the Defense of Women: Gender, Office Holding, and National Security Policy in Established Democracies,” *Journal of Politics* 73 (January 2011): 1-16.

Recommended:

- Keohane, Robert O., “International relations theory: Contributions of a feminist standpoint” *Millennium* 18, no. 2 (1989): 245-253.
- Valerie M. Hudson, Mary Caprioli, Bonnie Ballif-Spanvill, Rose McDermott, and Chad F. Emmett, “The Heart of the Matter: The Security of Women and the Security of States,” *International Security* 33, no. 3 (2008/09): 7-45.
- J. Ann Tickner, “What is Your Research Program? Some Feminist Answers to International Relations Methodological Questions,” *International Studies Quarterly* 49, no. 1 (2005): 1-21.
- Dara Kay Cohen, “Explaining rape during civil war: Cross-national evidence (1980-2009),” *American Political Science Review* 107, no. 3 (2013): 461-477.

Further reading:

- J. Ann Tickner, *Gendering World Politics* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2001): Ch. 1, 2, 4.
- Joshua Goldstein, *Gender and War* (Cambridge University Press 2001) Ch. 1, 4, 5.
- Valerie M. Hudson, Bonnie Ballif-Spanvill, Mary Caprioli and Chad F. Emmett, *Sex and World Peace* (Columbia University Press, 2012).
- Dan Reiter, “The positivist study of gender and international relations,” *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 59, no. 7 (2015): 1301-1326.

c) **Constructivist Approaches**

- Alexander Wendt, “Anarchy Is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics,” *International Organization*, Vol. 46, No. 2 (Spring 1992), pp. 391-425.

Recommended:

- Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink, “International Norm Dynamics and Political Change,” *International Organization* 52, no. 4 (1998): 887-917.
- Christopher Hemmer and Peter Katzenstein, “Why is there no NATO in Asia? Collective Identity, Regionalism, and the Origins of Multilateralism,” *International Organization* 56, no. 3 (2002): 575-607.
- Amitav Acharya, “How ideas spread: Whose norms matter? Norm localization and institutional change in Asian regionalism,” *International Organization* 58, no. 2 (2004): 239-275.

- Nina Tannenwald, “The nuclear taboo: The United States and the normative basis of nuclear non-use,” *International Organization* 53, no. 3 (1999): 433-468.

Further reading:

- Emanuel Adler, “Constructivism in international relations: sources, contributions, and debates,” *Handbook of International Relations* 2 (2013): 112-144.
- Rawi Abdelal, Yoshiko M Herrera, Alastair Iain Johnston and Rose McDermott, “Identity as a Variable,” *Perspectives on Politics* 4, no. 4 (2006): 695-711.

4. **Domestic Politics and War** Tuesday, Mar. 28

a) **Democratic Peace**

- John R. Oneal and Bruce Russett, “The Kantian Peace: The Pacific Benefits of Democracy, Interdependence, and International Organizations, 1885-1992,” *World Politics* 52, 1 (October 1999), 1-37.
- Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, James D. Morrow, Randolph M. Siverson, and Alastair Smith, “An Institutional Explanation of the Democratic Peace,” *American Political Science Review* 93 (1999): 791-807.
- Michael Tomz and Jessica Weeks, “Public Opinion and the Democratic Peace,” *American Political Science Review* 107, no. 4 (2013): 849-865.

Recommended:

- Michael Doyle, “Liberalism and World Politics,” *American Political Science Review* 80 (1986): 1151-69.
- Lars-Erik Cederman, “Back to Kant: Reinterpreting the democratic peace as a macrohistorical learning process,” *American Political Science Review* 95 (2001):15-31.
- Sebastian Rosato, “The Flawed Logic of Democratic Peace Theory,” *American Political Science Review* 97 (2003): 585-602.
- Erik Gartzke, “The capitalist peace,” *American Journal of Political Science* 51, no. 1 (2007): 166-191.

Further reading:

- David A. Lake, “Powerful pacifists: Democratic states and war,” *American Political Science Review* 86, no. 1 (1992): 24-37.
- David L. Rousseau, Christopher Gelpi, Dan Reiter, and Paul K. Huth, “Assessing the Dyadic Nature of the Democratic Peace, 1918-1988,” *American Political Science Review* 90, 3 (1996): 512-533.
- Erik Gartzke, “Kant we all just get along? Opportunity, willingness, and the origins of the democratic peace,” *American Journal of Political Science* 42 (1998): 1-27.
- James D. Fearon, “Domestic Politics, Foreign Policy, and Theories of International Relations,” *Annual Review of Political Science* 1 (1998): 289-313.

b) **Domestic Political Constraints**

- James Fearon, “Domestic Political Audiences and the Escalation of International Disputes.” *American Political Science Review* 88 (1994): 577-592.

- Tim Groeling and Matthew A. Baum, “Crossing the water’s edge: Elite rhetoric, media coverage, and the rally-round-the-flag phenomenon,” *The Journal of Politics* 70, no. 4 (2008): 1065-1085.
- Robert F. Trager and Lynn Vavreck, “The political costs of crisis bargaining: Presidential rhetoric and the role of party,” *American Journal of Political Science* 55, no. 3 (2011): 526-545.

Recommended:

- Robert Putnam, “Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games,” *International Organization* 42, no. 3 (1988): 427-460.
- Kurt Dassel, “Civilians, Soldiers, and Strife: Domestic Sources of International Aggression,” *International Security* 23,1 (Summer 1998): 107-140.
- Chaim Kaufmann, “Threat Inflation and the Failure of the Marketplace of Ideas: The Selling of the Iraq War,” *International Security*, vol. 29, no 1 (Summer 2004).
- Patrick J. McDonald, “Great powers, hierarchy, and endogenous regimes: Rethinking the domestic causes of peace,” *International Organization* 69, no. 3 (2015): 557-588.

Further reading:

- Matthew Baum, “The Constituent Foundations of the Rally-Round-the-Flag Phenomenon,” *International Studies Quarterly* 46, no. 2 (2002): 263-298.
- Amy Oakes, “Diversionary War and Argentina’s Invasion of the Falkland Islands,” *Security Studies* 15, no. 3 (July 2006): 431-463.
- Stephen Chaudoin, Helen V. Milner, and Dustin H. Tingley, “The center still holds: Liberal internationalism survives,” *International Security* 35, no. 1 (2010): 75-94.
- Michael Tomz, “Domestic Audience Costs in International Relations: An Experimental Approach,” *International Organization* 61, no. 4 (Fall 2007): 821-40.

c) Individual Leaders

- Jessica L. Weeks, “Strongmen and Straw Men: Authoritarian Regimes and the Initiation of International Conflict,” *American Political Science Review* 106, no. 2 (2012): 326-347.

Recommended:

- Daniel L. Byman and Kenneth M. Pollack, “Let Us Now Praise Great Men: Bringing the Statesman Back In,” *International Security* 25, no. 4 (Spring 2001): 107-146.
- Jessica L. Weeks, “Autocratic Audience Costs: Regime Type and Signaling Resolve,” *International Organization* 62, no. 1 (Winter 2008): 35-64.
- Michael C. Horowitz and Allan C. Stam, “How prior military experience influences the future militarized behavior of leaders,” *International Organization* 68, no. 3 (2014): 527-559.
- Jeff D. Colgan and Jessica LP Weeks, “Revolution, personalist dictatorships, and international conflict.” *International Organization* 69, no. 1 (2015): 163-194.

Further reading:

- Michael C. Horowitz, Philip Potter, Todd S. Sechser, and Allan Stam, “Sizing Up the Adversary: Leader Attributes and Coercion in International Conflict,” *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 62, no. 10 (2018): 2180-2204.

- Alexandre Debs and Hein E. Goemans, “Regime type, the fate of leaders, and war,” *American Political Science Review* 104, no. 3 (2010): 430-445.

5. **Civil Conflict and Terrorism**..... Tuesday, Apr. 4

c) **Causes of Civil War and Insurgency**

- Charles Tilly, *From Mobilization to Revolution* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan, 1977): Ch. 1.
- James D. Fearon and David D. Laitin, “Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War,” *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 97, No. 1 (February 2003): 75-90.
- Edward Miguel, Shanker Satyanath, and Ernest Sergenti, “Economic Shocks and Civil Conflict: An Instrumental Variables Approach,” *Journal of Political Economy* 112, no. 4 (2004): 725-753.

Recommended:

- Barry Posen, “The Security Dilemma and Ethnic Conflict,” *Survival* (1993).
- James D. Fearon and David D. Laitin, “Explaining Interethnic Cooperation,” *American Political Science Review* 90, no. 4 (December 1996): 715-35.
- Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler, “Greed and Grievance in Civil Wars,” *Oxford Economic Papers* 56, no. 4 (2004): 563-595.
- Havard Hegre and Nicholas Sambanis “Sensitivity Analysis of Empirical Results on Civil War Onset,” *Journal of Conflict Resolution* vol. 50, no. 4 (2006): 508-35.

Further reading:

- Ted Robert Gurr, *Why Men Rebel* (Routledge, 1970): Ch. 1-2.
- James D. Fearon, “Commitment Problems and the Spread of Ethnic Conflict,” in *The International Spread of Ethnic Conflict*, ed. David Lake and Donald Rothchild (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998): 107-126.
- Stathis N. Kalyvas, “‘New’ and ‘Old’ Civil Wars: A Valid Distinction?” *World Politics*, Vol. 54, (October 2001): 99-118.
- Michael L. Ross, “How Do Natural Resources Influence Civil War? Evidence from Thirteen Cases,” *International Organization*, Vol. 58, No. 1 (Winter 2004): 35- 67.
- Monica Duffy Toft, *The Geography of Ethnic Violence* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2003), chapters 1-4.
- Paul Collier, “Rebellion as a Quasi Criminal Activity,” *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 46 (2000).
- Barbara F. Walter, “Bargaining failures and civil war,” *Annual Review of Political Science* 12 (2009): 243-261.
- Yuri M. Zhukov, “Trading hard hats for combat helmets: The economics of rebellion in eastern Ukraine,” *Journal of Comparative Economics* 44, no. 1 (2016): 1-15.

b) **Dynamics of Civil War and Insurgency**

- Andrew J.R. Mack, “Why Big Nations Lose Small Wars: The Politics of Asymmetric Conflict,” *World Politics* 27, no. 2 (1975): 175-200.
- Stathis N. Kalyvas, *The Logic of Violence in Civil War* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006): Ch. 4-7.

Recommended:

- David Galula, *Counter-Insurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice* (New York: Praeger, 1964/2006): Chapters 1-5.
- Nathan Leites and Charles Wolf, Jr. *Rebellion and Authority: An Analytic Essay on Insurgent Conflicts* (Chicago: Markham, 1970).
- Jason Lyall, “Does Indiscriminate Violence Incite Insurgent Attacks? Evidence from Chechnya,” *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 53, no. 3 (2009): 331-362.
- Jason Lyall and Isaiah Wilson, “Rage Against the Machines: Explaining Outcomes in Counterinsurgency Wars,” *International Organization* 63, no. 1 (2009): 67-106.

Further reading:

- T.E. Lawrence, “Evolution of a Revolt,” *Army Quarterly and Defence Journal* (1920).
- Mao Tse-Tung, *On Guerilla Warfare* (Washington, DC: Department of the Navy, 1989): 41-70.
- Roger Trinquier, *Modern Warfare: A French View of Counterinsurgency* (Ft. Leavenworth, KS: U.S. Army CGSC, 1985).
- Robert Thompson, *Defeating Communist Insurgency: Experiences from Malaya and Vietnam* (London: Chatto & Windus, 1966).
- Benjamin Valentino, Paul Huth, and Dylan Balch-Lindsay, “‘Draining the Sea’: Mass Killing and Guerrilla Warfare,” *International Organization* 58, no. 2 (April 2004): 375-407.
- James Fearon, “Why Do Some Civil Wars Last So Much Longer than Others?” *Journal of Peace Research* vol. 41, no. 3 (2004): 275-301.
- Jeremy M. Weinstein, *Inside rebellion: The politics of insurgent violence*. Cambridge University Press, 2006.
- Stephen Biddle, Jeffrey Friedman and Jacob Shapiro, “Testing the Surge: Why Violence Declined in Iraq in 2007,” *International Security* 37, no. 1 (2012): 1-34.
- Monica Duffy Toft and Yuri M. Zhukov, “Islamists and Nationalists: Rebel Motivation and Counterinsurgency in Russia’s North Caucasus,” *American Political Science Review* 109, no. 2 (2015): 222-238.
- Michael J. Reese, Keven G. Ruby and Robert A. Pape, “Days of action or restraint? How the Islamic calendar impacts violence,” *American Political Science Review* 111, no. 3 (2017): 439-459.
- Niall McKay, “When Lanchester met Richardson, the outcome was stalemate: a parable for mathematical models of insurgency,” *Journal of the Operational Research Society* 66, no. 2 (2013): 191-201.
- U.S. Army Field Manual 3-24: Chapter 1.
- Stephen Biddle and Stathis Kalyvas, “The New U.S. Army/Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual as Political Science and Political Praxis,” *Perspectives on Politics*, Vol. 6, No. 2 (June 2008): 347-353.
- Erica Chenoweth and Maria Stepan, *Why Civil Resistance Works: The Strategic Logic of Non-Violent Conflict* (Columbia University Press: 2011).

c) **Terrorism**

- Martha Crenshaw, “The causes of terrorism,” *Comparative Politics* 13, no. 4 (1981): 379-399.
- Robert Pape, “The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism,” *American Political Science Review* 97, no. 3 (2003).
- Michael C. Horowitz, “Nonstate actors and the diffusion of innovations: the case of suicide terrorism,” *International Organization* 64 (2010): 33-64.

Recommended:

- Alan B. Krueger and Jitka Maleckova, “Education, Poverty, and Terrorism: Is There a Causal Connection?” *Journal of Economic Perspectives* 17, no. 4 (2003): 119-144.
- Max Abrahms, “Why Terrorism Does not Work,” *International Security* 31, no. 2 (2006).
- Alberto Abadie, “Poverty, political freedom, and the roots of terrorism,” *American Economic Review* 96, no. 2 (2006): 50-56.
- David B. Carter. 2016. ‘Provocation and the strategy of terrorist and guerrilla attacks.’ *International Organization* 70(1): 133-173.

Further reading:

- Walter Enders and Todd Sandler, “The Effectiveness of Anti-Terrorism Policies: Vector-Autoregression-Intervention Analysis,” *American Political Science Review* 87 (1993): 829-844.
- Mia M. Bloom, *Dying to Kill: The Global Phenomenon of Suicide Terror* (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 2005).
- Lawrence R. Iannaccone and Eli Berman, “Religious Extremists: The Good, the Bad and the Deadly,” *Public Choice* 128, no. 1-2 (2006): 109-129.
- Alberto Abadie and Javier Gardeazabal, “The Economic Costs of Conflict: A Case Study of the Basque Country,” *American Economic Review* 93, no. 1 (2003): 113-132.
- Ethan Bueno de Mesquita and Eric S. Dickson, “The propaganda of the deed: Terrorism, counterterrorism, and mobilization,” *American Journal of Political Science* 51, no. 2 (2007): 364-381.
- Ethan Bueno de Mesquita, “Politics and the suboptimal provision of counterterror,” *International Organization* 61, no. 1 (2007): 9-36.
- Robert Powell, “Defending Against Terrorist Attacks with Limited Resources,” *American Political Science Review* 101, no. 3 (2007): 527-541.
- Max Abrahms and Philip Potter, “Explaining terrorism: Leadership deficits and militant group tactics,” *International Organization* 69, no. 2 (2015): 311-342.
- Eli Berman and David D. Laitin, “Religion, Terrorism and Public Goods: Testing the Club Model,” NBER Working Paper 13725 (2008).
- Khusrav Gaibulloev, James A. Piazza and Todd Sandler, “Regime types and terrorism,” *International Organization* 71, no. 3 (2017): 491-522.

6. **Military Strategy** Tuesday, Apr. 11

a) **Classical and Modern Strategy**

- Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, Michael Howard and Peter Paret editor and translator (Princeton University Press: 2007): Book I Ch. 1, 7; Book II Ch. 2.
- Barry R. Posen, *The Sources of Military Doctrine: France, Britain, and Germany Between the World Wars* (Cornell University Press, 1984): Chapters 1, 2.

Recommended:

- John Shy. 1986. ‘Jomini,’ in *Makers of Modern Strategy*: Chapter 6.
- Brian Bond, Martin Alexander. 1986. ‘Liddell Hart and De Gaulle: The Doctrines of Limited Liability and Mobile Defense,’ in *Makers of Modern Strategy*: Chapter 20.
- Michael Howard. 1986. ‘Men Against Fire: The Doctrine of the Offensive in 1914,’ in *Makers of Modern Strategy*: Chapter 18.
- Anatol Rapoport. 1957. ‘Lewis F. Richardson’s mathematical theory of war.’ *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 1(3).

Further reading:

- John Lewis Gaddis. 1981. ‘Containment: Its Present and Future,’ *International Security* 5(4).
- Felix Gilbert. 1986. ‘Machiavelli: The Renaissance of the Art of War,’ in *Makers of Modern Strategy*, Peter Paret ed. Princeton University Press: Chapter 1.
- Carl von Clausewitz. 2007. *On War*. Michael Howard and Peter Paret editor and translator. Princeton University Press: Book III Chapters 1-5, 11, 14, 17; Book VI Chapters. 1-8, 26; Book VII Chapters 1-8.
- Peter Paret. 1986. ‘Clausewitz,’ in *Makers of Modern Strategy*, Peter Paret ed. Princeton University Press: Chapter 7.
- Barry R. Posen. 1993. ‘Nationalism, the Mass Army and Military Power,’ *International Security* 18 (2): 80-124.
- Antoine Henri de Jomini. 1836/2007. *The Art of War*. Rockville, MD: Arc Manor.
- Seth Bonder. 2002. ‘Army Operations Research: Historical Perspectives and Lessons Learned,’ *Operations Research* 50 (1): 25-34.

b) Conventional Warfare

- John J. Mearsheimer, “Assessing the Conventional Balance: The 3:1 Rule and Its Critics,” *International Security* 13, no. 4 (1989): 54-89.
- Stephen Biddle, *Military Power: Explaining Victory and Defeat in Modern Battle*, (Princeton University Press: 2004): Chapters 1-3.

Recommended:

- Bernard Brodie, *The Heritage of Douhet* (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 1953).
- Robert Pape, *Bombing to Win: Air Power and Coercion in War* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1996): Chapters 1-3.
- Alex Weisiger, “Learning from the Battlefield: Information, Domestic Politics, and Interstate War Duration,” *International Organization* 70 (Spring 2016): 347-375.
- Todd Lehmann and Yuri M. Zhukov, “Until the Bitter End? The Diffusion of Surrender Across Battles,” *International Organization* 73, no. 1 (2019): 133-169.

Further reading:

- Edward Warner. 1943. ‘Douhet, Mitchell, Seversky: Theories of Air Warfare’ in *Makers of Modern Strategy*, Edward Mead Earle, ed. Princeton University Press: 485-503.
- John J. Mearsheimer, *Conventional Deterrence* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1983): Chapters 1, 2 and 7.
- Joshua M. Epstein. 1984. *The Calculus of Conventional War: Dynamic Analysis without Lanchester Theory*, Washington, DC: Brookings.
- John J. Mearsheimer, Barry R. Posen and Eliot A. Cohen. 1989. ‘Correspondence,’ *International Security*, 13(4): 128-179.
- Jerome Bracken. 1995. ‘Lanchester models of the Ardennes campaign.’ *Naval Research Logistics* 42(4): 559-577.
- Kristopher W. Ramsay. 2008. ‘Settling It on the Field Battlefield Events and War Termination.’ *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 52(6): 850-879.
- Niall J. McKay. 2007. ‘Lanchester combat models,’ working paper.

c) Nuclear Strategy

- Albert Wohlstetter, “The Delicate Balance of Terror,” RAND Research Paper, P-1472 (December, 1958).
- Keir Leiber and Daryl Press, “The End of MAD?” *International Security* 30, no. 4 (2006): 7-44.
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7. Student Research Marathon Tuesday, Apr. 18