

Online Appendices: “Repression Works (just not in moderation)”


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A1. ADDITIONAL ANALYSES OF CHECHNYA

Figure A1.1 reports estimated dose-response functions for Chechnya, with PRIO grid cells as spatial units of analysis. Apart from the increased range of numerical values (due to the relatively larger area of grid cells), the shapes of the relationship are the same as for the district-month results reported in Figure 4 of the main text.

Figure A1.1: DOSE-RESPONSE FUNCTION, VIOLENCE IN CHECHNYA (grid cell-month). Dark line represents conditional expectation of rebel violence (vertical axis) in the month following each level of government repression (horizontal axis). Shaded area is 95% confidence interval. Short dashes indicate empirical distribution of treatment variable. Inverse probability of treatment weights estimated with CBGPS. Vertical axis on logarithmic scale.



A2. ADDITIONAL ANALYSES OF VARIATION IN ESTIMATED THRESHOLD LEVELS

Tables A2.1-A2.8 report the full set of results summarized in Table 1 in the main text. Tables A2.1-A2.4 report the proportions of countries that had monotonically increasing dose-response curves, grouped by whether they had a high or low number of secret police agencies at the start of the conflict (A2.1), whether rebels received external support at the start of the conflict (A2.2), whether freedom of discussion was restricted (A2.3), and whether the country had ratified the ICCPR by the start of the conflict (A2.4). Tables A2.5-A2.8 report median estimated thresholds for countries with \wedge -shaped dose-response curves, grouped by whether they had a high or low number of secret

police agencies at the start of the conflict (A2.5), whether rebels received external support at the start of the conflict (A2.6), whether freedom of discussion was restricted (A2.7), and whether the country had ratified the ICCPR by the start of the conflict (A2.8).

Missing values (e.g. PITF in Table A2.1) indicate insufficient data to calculate group statistics.

Source	Scale and Model	Difference	$\widehat{\pi}_{hi\ sp}$	$\widehat{\pi}_{lo\ sp}$	K.S. Test
ACLED	Monotonically increasing (Polynomial)	-0.01	0.00	0.01	0
	Monotonically increasing (Threshold)	-0.28	0.00	0.28	0.3'
GED	Monotonically increasing (Polynomial)	-0.05	0.00	0.05	0
	Monotonically increasing (Threshold)	-0.53	0.00	0.53	0.5**
PITF	Monotonically increasing (Polynomial)			0.09	
	Monotonically increasing (Threshold)			0.00	
SCAD	Monotonically increasing (Polynomial)	-0.06	0.00	0.06	0.1
	Monotonically increasing (Threshold)	0.00	0.00	0.00	0
Combined	Monotonically increasing (Polynomial)	-0.04	0.00	0.04	0
	Monotonically increasing (Threshold)	-0.27	0.00	0.27	0.3*

Table A2.1: SECRET POLICE AGENCIES AND PROBABILITY OF NEVER REACHING THRESHOLD. $\widehat{\pi}_{hi\ sp}$ ($\widehat{\pi}_{lo\ sp}$) is the proportion of conflicts in which the estimated DRF is monotonically increasing, among countries with (without) a high number of secret police agencies.

Source	Scale and Model	Difference	$\widehat{\pi}_{ext}$	$\widehat{\pi}_{no\ ext}$	K.S. Test
ACLED	Monotonically increasing (Polynomial)	0.00	0.00	0.00	0
	Monotonically increasing (Threshold)	-0.12	0.12	0.24	0
GED	Monotonically increasing (Polynomial)	0.06	0.08	0.02	0.1
	Monotonically increasing (Threshold)	-0.18	0.38	0.57	0
PITF	Monotonically increasing (Polynomial)	0.08	0.12	0.05	0.1
	Monotonically increasing (Threshold)	0.00	0.00	0.00	0
SCAD	Monotonically increasing (Polynomial)	0.00	0.00	0.00	0
	Monotonically increasing (Threshold)	0.00	0.00	0.00	0
Combined	Monotonically increasing (Polynomial)	0.02	0.04	0.01	0
	Monotonically increasing (Threshold)	-0.14	0.16	0.30	0

Table A2.2: EXTERNAL SUPPORT FOR REBELS AND PROBABILITY OF NEVER REACHING THRESHOLD. $\widehat{\pi}_{ext}$ ($\widehat{\pi}_{no\ ext}$) is the proportion of conflicts in which the estimated DRF is monotonically increasing, among countries where rebels did (not) receive external support.

Source	Scale and Model	Difference	$\widehat{\pi}_{fd}$	$\widehat{\pi}_{no\ fd}$	K.S. Test
ACLED	Monotonically increasing (Polynomial)	0.01	0.01	0.00	0
	Monotonically increasing (Threshold)	0.23	0.31	0.08	0.2'
GED	Monotonically increasing (Polynomial)	0.07	0.09	0.02	0.1
	Monotonically increasing (Threshold)	-0.10	0.39	0.49	0.1
PITF	Monotonically increasing (Polynomial)	0.25	0.29	0.04	0.2
	Monotonically increasing (Threshold)	0.00	0.00	0.00	0
SCAD	Monotonically increasing (Polynomial)	-0.07	0.00	0.07	0.1
	Monotonically increasing (Threshold)	0.00	0.00	0.00	0
Combined	Monotonically increasing (Polynomial)	0.02	0.05	0.03	0
	Monotonically increasing (Threshold)	0.10	0.29	0.19	0.1

Table A2.3: FREEDOM OF DISCUSSION AND PROBABILITY OF NEVER REACHING THRESHOLD. $\widehat{\pi}_{fd}$ ($\widehat{\pi}_{no\ fd}$) is the proportion of conflicts in which the estimated DRF is monotonically increasing, among countries with (without) freedom of discussion.

Source	Scale and Model	Difference	$\widehat{\pi}_{hr}$	$\widehat{\pi}_{no\ hr}$	K.S. Test
ACLED	Monotonically increasing (Polynomial)	0.01	0.01	0.00	0.01
	Monotonically increasing (Threshold)	0.20	0.26	0.06	0.2
GED	Monotonically increasing (Polynomial)	0.06	0.06	0.00	0.1
	Monotonically increasing (Threshold)	0.73	0.73	0.00	0.7***
PITF	Monotonically increasing (Polynomial)	-0.97	0.03	1.00	1'
	Monotonically increasing (Threshold)	0.00	0.00	0.00	0
SCAD	Monotonically increasing (Polynomial)	0.12	0.12	0.00	0.1
	Monotonically increasing (Threshold)	0.00	0.00	0.00	6e-17
Combined	Monotonically increasing (Polynomial)	0.01	0.04	0.03	0.005
	Monotonically increasing (Threshold)	0.29	0.31	0.02	0.3***

Table A2.4: ICCPR RATIFICATION AND PROBABILITY OF NEVER REACHING THRESHOLD. $\widehat{\pi}_{hr}$ ($\widehat{\pi}_{no\ hr}$) is the proportion of conflicts in which the estimated DRF is monotonically increasing, among ratifying (non-ratifying) countries.

Source	Scale and Model	Difference	$\widehat{\tau}_{sp}$	$\widehat{\tau}_{no\ sp}$	K.S. Test
ACLED	z-score (Polynomial)	-2.40	5.00	7.41	0.5***
	z-score (Threshold)	-0.46	1.29	1.75	0.4**
	Min-Max (Polynomial)	-0.02	0.52	0.54	0.5***
	Min-Max (Threshold)	-0.00	0.16	0.16	0.5**
GED	z-score (Polynomial)	0.76	14.04	13.28	0.5*
	z-score (Threshold)	9.05	10.91	1.86	0.8***
	Min-Max (Polynomial)	-0.03	0.47	0.50	0.5*
	Min-Max (Threshold)	0.30	0.36	0.06	0.8***
PITF	z-score (Polynomial)			10.28	
	z-score (Threshold)			11.78	
	Min-Max (Polynomial)			0.52	
	Min-Max (Threshold)			0.65	
SCAD	z-score (Polynomial)	-2.75	19.99	22.74	0.5
	z-score (Threshold)	-2.34	2.16	4.49	0.7
	Min-Max (Polynomial)	0.01	0.52	0.52	0.5
	Min-Max (Threshold)	-0.10	0.06	0.16	0.7
Combined	z-score (Polynomial)	-6.27	5.70	11.97	0.4***
	z-score (Threshold)	-1.19	1.85	3.04	0.3*
	Min-Max (Polynomial)	-0.02	0.49	0.51	0.4***
	Min-Max (Threshold)	0.01	0.18	0.17	0.3**

Table A2.5: THRESHOLD LEVEL AND SECRET POLICE AGENCIES. $\widehat{\tau}_{hi\ sp}$ ($\widehat{\tau}_{lo\ sp}$) is the median estimated threshold for countries with (without) a high number of secret police agencies prior to the conflict. z -score standardization expresses threshold values as standard deviations above mean levels of repression per province-month. Min-Max standardization rescales threshold levels to the interval of 0 and 1.

Source	Scale and Model	Difference	$\widehat{\tau}_{\text{ext}}$	$\widehat{\tau}_{\text{no ext}}$	K.S. Test
ACLED	z-score (Polynomial)	-1.37	5.00	6.37	0
	z-score (Threshold)	0.10	1.62	1.52	0.3'
	Min-Max (Polynomial)	0.01	0.54	0.52	0.2
	Min-Max (Threshold)	0.07	0.16	0.09	0.2
GED	z-score (Polynomial)	5.66	18.94	13.28	0.4*
	z-score (Threshold)	2.89	5.93	3.04	0.3
	Min-Max (Polynomial)	0.05	0.50	0.45	0.5**
	Min-Max (Threshold)	0.05	0.11	0.06	0.3
PITF	z-score (Polynomial)	1.93	11.97	10.03	0.3
	z-score (Threshold)	3.99	14.76	10.76	0.4
	Min-Max (Polynomial)	-0.03	0.50	0.52	0
	Min-Max (Threshold)	0.16	0.81	0.65	0.2
SCAD	z-score (Polynomial)	0.00	13.74	13.74	0
	z-score (Threshold)	1.21	2.47	1.26	0.2
	Min-Max (Polynomial)	0.00	0.57	0.57	0
	Min-Max (Threshold)	0.05	0.11	0.06	0.2
Combined	z-score (Polynomial)	0.00	10.03	10.03	0.1
	z-score (Threshold)	-0.00	1.85	1.86	0.2
	Min-Max (Polynomial)	0.02	0.52	0.50	0.2*
	Min-Max (Threshold)	0.00	0.17	0.16	0.2

Table A2.6: THRESHOLD LEVEL AND EXTERNAL SUPPORT FOR REBELS. $\widehat{\tau}_{\text{ext}}$ ($\widehat{\tau}_{\text{no ext}}$) is the median estimated threshold in conflicts where rebels did (not) receive external support. *z*-score standardization expresses threshold values as standard deviations above mean levels of repression per province-month. Min-Max standardization rescales threshold levels to the interval of 0 and 1.

Source	Scale and Model	Difference	$\widehat{\tau}_{fd}$	$\widehat{\tau}_{no\ fd}$	K.S. Test
ACLED	z-score (Polynomial)	0.89	6.93	6.04	0.3**
	z-score (Threshold)	0.10	1.62	1.52	0.2
	Min-Max (Polynomial)	0.05	0.57	0.52	0.5***
	Min-Max (Threshold)	-0.09	0.07	0.16	0.3'
GED	z-score (Polynomial)	8.36	20.89	12.53	0.9***
	z-score (Threshold)	-6.31	1.74	8.05	0.1
	Min-Max (Polynomial)	0.03	0.50	0.47	0.5**
	Min-Max (Threshold)	-0.25	0.05	0.29	0
PITF	z-score (Polynomial)	3.44	13.47	10.03	0.8*
	z-score (Threshold)	7.98	17.73	9.75	0.7**
	Min-Max (Polynomial)	-0.04	0.48	0.52	0.1
	Min-Max (Threshold)	0.33	0.98	0.65	0.5
SCAD	z-score (Polynomial)	12.77	31.40	18.63	0.7'
	z-score (Threshold)	15.76	19.53	3.77	0.6*
	Min-Max (Polynomial)	-0.08	0.44	0.52	0.3
	Min-Max (Threshold)	0.32	0.44	0.12	0.5'
Combined	z-score (Polynomial)	6.44	16.47	10.03	0.4***
	z-score (Threshold)	-2.78	1.75	4.52	0.1
	Min-Max (Polynomial)	0.03	0.53	0.50	0.3***
	Min-Max (Threshold)	-0.12	0.07	0.19	0.1

Table A2.7: THRESHOLD LEVEL AND FREEDOM OF DISCUSSION. $\widehat{\tau}_{fd}$ ($\widehat{\tau}_{no\ fd}$) is the median estimated threshold in countries where freedom of discussion was unrestricted (restricted) when conflict began. *z*-score standardization expresses threshold values as standard deviations above mean levels of repression per province-month. Min-Max standardization rescales threshold levels to the interval of 0 and 1.

Source	Scale and Model	Difference	$\widehat{\tau}_{hr}$	$\widehat{\tau}_{no\ hr}$	K.S. Test
ACLED	z-score (Polynomial)	2.40	7.41	5.00	0.5***
	z-score (Threshold)	-0.36	1.62	1.98	0.4*
	Min-Max (Polynomial)	-0.02	0.52	0.54	0.5***
	Min-Max (Threshold)	-0.41	0.09	0.51	0.6***
GED	z-score (Polynomial)	-0.76	13.28	14.04	0.4*
	z-score (Threshold)	-3.88	3.04	6.92	0.5'
	Min-Max (Polynomial)	-0.01	0.45	0.47	0.3'
	Min-Max (Threshold)	-0.11	0.06	0.17	0.5*
PITF	z-score (Polynomial)		10.28		
	z-score (Threshold)	-0.00	11.78	11.78	0.6
	Min-Max (Polynomial)		0.52		
	Min-Max (Threshold)	-0.34	0.65	0.99	1'
SCAD	z-score (Polynomial)	15.52	29.27	13.74	0.5
	z-score (Threshold)	1.23	4.91	3.67	0.4'
	Min-Max (Polynomial)	-0.02	0.51	0.53	0.3
	Min-Max (Threshold)	-0.04	0.12	0.16	0.3
Combined	z-score (Polynomial)	-3.04	10.28	13.32	0.2
	z-score (Threshold)	1.06	3.03	1.98	0.2
	Min-Max (Polynomial)	-0.01	0.51	0.52	0.2*
	Min-Max (Threshold)	0.01	0.18	0.17	0.2

Table A2.8: THRESHOLD LEVEL AND ICCPR RATIFICATION. $\widehat{\tau}_{hr}$ ($\widehat{\tau}_{no\ hr}$) is the median estimated threshold in countries that had (not) ratified the ICCPR before conflict began. z -score standardization expresses threshold values as standard deviations above mean levels of repression per province-month. Min-Max standardization rescales threshold levels to the interval of 0 and 1.

A3. FULL LIST OF SECRET POLICE AGENCIES

Table A3.9 reports the complete list of secret police agencies used in the analyses reported in Table 1 and Figure 7 of the main text, along with their country codes (ISO 3166) and dates of operation.

Table A3.9: Full list of secret police agencies.

Country	Agency	Dates
AFG	AGSA (Department for Safeguarding the Interests of Afghanistan)	(1978-1979)
AFG	KAM (Security and Intelligence Organization)	(1979-1979)
AFG	Khedamat-e Etelea'at-e Dawlati (KHAD) (Government Intelligence Service)	(1980-1985)
AFG	Wizarat-i Amaniyyat-i Dawlati (WAD) (Ministry of State Security)	(1985-1992)
AFG	Khedamat-e Etelea'at-e Dawlati (KHAD) (Government Intelligence Service)	(2001-2004)
ALB	Drejtorija e Sigurimit t Shtetit (Sigurimi) (Directorate of State Security)	(1944-1991)
DZA	Ministre de l'Armement et des Liaisons gnerales (MALG)	(1957-1962)
DZA	Scurit Militaire (SM)	(1962-1990)

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Table A3.9: Full list of secret police agencies.

Country	Agency	Dates
DZA	Dpartement du Renseignement et de la Scurit (Department of Intelligence and Security)	(1990-2013)
AGO	Direco de Informao e Segurana de Angola (DISA) (Directorate of Information and Security of Angola)	(1975-1979)
ARG	Sociedad Popular Restauradora (Mazorca)	(1833-1846)
ARG	Coordinacin de Informaciones de Estado (CIDE) (State Intelligence Coordination)	(1946-1956)
ARG	Secretara de Informaciones de Estado (SIDE) (Secretariat of State Information)	(1956-1976)
ARG	Secretara de Inteligencia del Estado (SIDE) (Secretariat of State Intelligence)	(1976-2001)
ARG	Secretara de Inteligencia (SI) (Secretariat of Intelligence)	(2001-2015)
BHR	National Security Agency	(2002-)
BLR	State Security Committee (KDB)	(1991-)
BOL	Servicio Especial de Seguridad (SES) (Special Security Service)	(1987-1989)
BRA	Departamento de Operaes Internas-Centro de Operaes de Defesa Interna (DOI-CODI) (Internal Operations Department-Centre for Internal Defence Operations)	(1969-1976)
BRA	Fora Nacional de Segurana Pblica (FNSP) (National Public Security Force)	(2004-)
BGR	Obshchestvena bezopasnost	(1907-1925)
BGR	Otdel Dravna sigurnost	(1925-1944)
BGR	Komitet za dravna sigurnost (CDS) (The Committee for State Security)	(1963-1990)
KHM	Santebal	(1975-1979)
CAF	Force spciale de dfense des institutions rpublicaines (FORSIDIR) (The Presidential Lifeguard)	(1998-2000)
CAF	Unit de securit prsidentielle (USP) (Presidential Security Organisation)	(2000-2003)
CAF	Office central de rpression du banditisme (OCRB) (Central Office of Banditry Repression)	(1996-1997)
CHL	Direccin de Inteligencia Nacional (DINA) (National Intelligence Directorate)	(1973-1977)
CHL	Central Nacional de Informaciones (CNI) (National Information Centre)	(1977-1990)
CHN	Ministry of Public Security (MPS)	(1949-)
CHN	Ministry of State Security (MSS)	(1983-)
CHN	Central Security Bureau (Unit 8341)	(1949-)
CHN	610 Office	(1999-)
CUB	Bureau for the Repression of Communist Activities	(1956-1961)
CUB	Direccin General De Inteligencia (DGI)	(1961-)
CSK	Sttn bezpenost (StB) (State Security)	(1945-1990)
COD	Centre Nationale de Documentation (CND) (National Documentation Center)	(1969-1980)

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Table A3.9: Full list of secret police agencies.

Country	Agency	Dates
COD	Agence Nationale de Documentation (AND) (National Documentation Agency)	(1980-1990)
COD	Service National d'Intelligence et de Protection (SNIP) (National Service for Intelligence and Protection)	(1990-1997)
DOM	Servicio Inteligencia Militar (SIM) - Military Intelligence Service	(1957-1962)
EGY	General Intelligence Directorate (GID)	(1954-)
EGY	State Security Investigations Service (SSI)	(1954-2011)
EGY	Homeland Security	(2013-)
SLV	Organizacin Democrtica Nacionalista (ORDEN) (Nationalist Democratic Organization)	(1961-1979)
FIN	Etsiv keskuspoliisi (EK)	(1927-1937)
FIN	Valtiollinen poliisi (Valpo) (State police)	(1937-1945)
FIN	Valpo II (Red Valpo)	(1945-1949)
DDR	Staatssicherheitsdienst (SSD) (Stasi)	(1950-1990)
DEU	Preussische Geheimpolizei	(1854-1933)
DEU	Gestapo	(1933-1945)
DEU	Sicherheitsdienst (SS)	(1933-1945)
DEU	Reich Main Security Office (RSHA)	(1939-1945)
GRC	Greek Military Police (ESA)	(1951-1974)
GTM	Guardia de Hacienda (Palace Guard)	(1954-1997)
HTI	Tonton Macoute	(1958-1986)
HUN	llamvdelmi Osztly (VO) (State Protection Department)	(1946-1948)
HUN	llamvdelmi Hatsg (VH) (State Protection Authority)	(1948-1956)
IDN	Komando Pemulihan Keamanan dan Ketertiban (Kopkamtib) (Security and Order Restoration Command)	(1965-1988)
IRN	Sazeman-i Ettelaat va Amniyat-i Keshvar (SAVAK) (National Organization for Intelligence and Security)	(1957-1979)
IRN	Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC)	(1979-)
IRN	Ministry of Intelligence and National Security (SAVAMA)	(1979-1984)
IRN	Ministry of Intelligence and National Security (VEVAK)	(1984-)
IRQ	Jihaz Al-Mukhabarat Al-A'ma (Mukhabarat) (Iraqi Intelligence Service)	(1973-2003)
IRL	Criminal Investigation Department (CID)	(1921-1923)
ITA	Organizzazione di Vigilanza Repressione dell'Antifascismo (OVRA) (Organization for Vigilance and Repression of Anti-Fascism)	(1927-1945)
JPN	Kenpeitai	(1881-1945)
JPN	Tokubetsu Kt Keisatsu (Tokko) (Special Higher Police)	(1911-1945)
JOR	General Investigation Directorate (GID)	(1952-1964)
JOR	General Intelligence Directorate (GID)	(1964-)
KAZ	Committee for National Security of Kazakhstan (KNB RK)	(1992-)
PRK	Ministry of Peoples Security	(1951-1972)
PRK	Public Security Division	(1972-2000)

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Table A3.9: Full list of secret police agencies.

Country	Agency	Dates
PRK	Ministry of People's Security	(2000-2010)
PRK	People's Security Department	(2010-)
PRK	Political Security Bureau	(1945-1951)
PRK	State Security Department (SSD)	(1973-)
KGZ	State Committee for National Security (GKNB)	(1992-)
MEX	Divisin de Investigaciones para la Prevencin de la Delincuencia (DIPD) (Investigation Division for the Prevention of Delinquency)	(1976-1982)
MOZ	Servio Nacional de Segurana Popular (National Popular Security Service) (SNASP)	(1975-1991)
MMR	Directorate of Defence Services Intelligence (DDSI)	(1959-2004)
MMR	Military Intelligence (MI)	(2004-)
MMR	Bureau Of Special Investigation (BSI)	(1948-)
NIC	Oficina de Seguridad Nacional (OSN)	(1972-1979)
NIC	Direccin General de Seguridad del Estado (DGSE) (Directorate-General of State Security)	(1979-1990)
NGA	Nigerian Security Organization (NSO)	(1976-1986)
NGA	State Security Service (SSS)	(1986-)
PRY	Pyragus (Hairy Feet)	(1814-1840)
PER	Grupo Especial de Inteligencia del Per (GEIN)	(1990-1993)
PHL	Metrocom Intelligence and Security Group (MISG)	(1972-1986)
PHL	National Intelligence and Security Authority (NISA)	(1972-1987)
POL	Urzd Bezpieczestwa Publicznego (UBP) (Office of Public Safety)	(1945-1954)
POL	Suba Bezpieczestwa (SB) (Security Service of the Ministry of Internal Af- fairs)	(1956-1990)
POL	Zmotoryzowane Odwody Milicji Obywatelskiej (ZOMO)	(1956-1989)
PRT	Polcia Preventiva (Preventive Police)	(1918-1919)
PRT	Polcia de Segurana do Estado (State Security Police)	(1919-1919)
PRT	Polcia de Defesa Social (Social Defense Police)	(1919-1926)
PRT	Polcia de Informaes (Informations Police)	(1926-1931)
PRT	Polcia de Vigilncia Poltica e Social (Political and Social Surveillance Police)	(1933-1933)
PRT	Polcia de Vigilncia e de Defesa do Estado (State Defence and Surveillance Police)	(1933-1945)
PRT	Polcia Internacional e de Defesa do Estado (PIDE) (International and State Defence Police)	(1945-1969)
PRT	Direco-Geral de Segurana (Directorate-General of Security)	(1969-1974)
KOR	Korea Central Intelligence Agency (KCIA)	(1961-1981)
KOR	Agency for National Security Planning (ANSP)	(1981-1999)
ROU	Direcia Poliiei i Siguranei Generale (Sigurana)	(1908-1944)
ROU	Departamentul Securittii statului (Securitate) (Department of State Secu- rity)	(1948-1989)
RUS	Third Section of Chancellery	(1826-1880)

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Table A3.9: Full list of secret police agencies.

Country	Agency	Dates
RUS	Special Corps of Gendarmes	(1827-1917)
RUS	Department for Protecting the Public Security and Order (Okhrana)	(1866-1917)
RUS	Supreme Administrative Commission for the Protection of State Order and Public Peace	(1880-1880)
RUS	Special Section of Police Department	(1898-1917)
RUS	All-Russian Emergency Commission for Combating Counter-Revolution and Sabotage (VchK)	(1917-1922)
RUS	State Political Directorate (GPU)	(1922-1923)
RUS	Joint State Political Directorate (OGPU)	(1923-1934)
RUS	Peoples Commissariat for Internal Affairs (NKVD)	(1934-1946)
RUS	Main Directorate of State Security (GUGB)	(1934-1941)
RUS	Peoples Commissariat for State Security (NKGB)	(1941-1946)
RUS	Ministry of State Security (MGB)	(1946-1953)
RUS	Committee for State Security (KGB)	(1954-1991)
RUS	Federal Counterintelligence Service (FSK)	(1993-1995)
RUS	Federal Protective Service (FSO)	(1996-)
RUS	Federal Security Service of the Russian Federation (FSB)	(1995-)
SAU	General Investigation Directorate (Mabahith)	(1961-)
SGP	Special Branch	(1948-1963)
SGP	Internal Security Department (ISD)	(1966-)
SOM	National Security Service	(1970-1990)
SOM	Hangash (Military Intelligence Unit)	(1978-1991)
ZAF	Bureau of State Security (BOSS)	(1969-1980)
ESP	Servicio de Informacin Militar (Military Information Service)	(1937-1939)
ESP	Brigada Poltico-Social (BPS) (Political-Social Brigade)	(1941-1978)
ESP	Servicio Central de Documentacin (SECED) (Central Documentation Service)	(1972-1977)
SDN	National Intelligence and Security Service (NISS)	(1956-)
SYR	Air Force Intelligence Directorate	(1963-)
SYR	General Intelligence Directorate (GID)	(1971-)
SYR	Military Intelligence Directorate	(1969-)
SYR	Political Security Directorate	(1987-)
TWN	Taiwan Garrison Command	(1945-1992)
TWN	Bureau of Investigation and Statistics (NBIS)	(1938-1946)
TWN	Counterintelligence Bureau under the Ministry of National Defense	(1946-1949)
TJK	National Security Committee (KNB)	(1991-1995)
TJK	Ministry of Security	(1995-2006)
TJK	State Committee of National Security (GKNB)	(2006-)
THA	Internal Security Operations Command (ISOC)	(1965-)
TUR	Tekilt- Mahsusa (Special Organization)	(1913-1918)
TUR	Milli Emniyet Hizmeti (MEH)	(1926-1965)

Continued on next page

Table A3.9: Full list of secret police agencies.

Country	Agency	Dates
TUR	Milli stihbarat Tekilat (MT)	(1965-)
TUR	Kamu Dzeni ve Gvenlii Mstearl (KDGM)	(2010-)
TKM	Committee for National Security (KNB)	(1991-2002)
TKM	Ministry for National Security	(2002-)
USA	COINTELPRO	(1956-1971)
UZB	National Security Service (SNB)	(1991-2005)
UZB	National Security Service (SNB-MVD)	(2005-)
VEN	Bolivarian Intelligence Service (SEBIN)	(2010-)
VEN	Direccin General de Contrainteligencia Militar (DIM)	(1957-1977)
VEN	National Directorate of Intelligence and Prevention Services (DISIP)	(1969-2009)
VEN	Direccin General de Polica (DIGEPOL)	(1958-1969)
VNM	Ministry of Public Security (B Cng an)	(1945-)
YUG	Department for People’s Protection (OZNA)	(1944-1946)
YUG	State Security Administration (UDBA)	(1946-1990)
YUG	Counterintelligence Service (KOS)	(1946-1991)
YUG	State Security Service (SDB)	(1991-2002)
YUG	Security Administration	(1992-2002)
ZWE	Central Intelligence Organisation	(1963-)

A4. ALTERNATIVE MEASURES OF CIVIL LIBERTIES

The analysis in Figure 7 of the main text suggests that, consistent with theoretical expectations, post-conflict governments are more likely to have a high number of secret police agencies, restrict foreign travel, and limit free discussion. We now consider whether a similar story holds with alternative measures of civil liberties.

Figure A4.2 replicates the models in Equations 6 and 7, with two alternative measures of surveillance capacity: number of pro-government militias active in country i , and Pemstein et al. (2018)’s freedom from political killings index.¹ Pro-government militias are typically better-informed about the local population’s loyalties than regular armed forces, and are able to target the regime’s opponents more selectively than regular armies (Lyall, 2010). The figure shows that post-conflict governments are more likely to rely on (or tolerate) pro-government militias; where these militias exist, the average lifespan of post-conflict regimes also appears to be longer. The same patterns hold for the second measure. To the extent that they are targeted, political assassinations require intelligence on the identities and whereabouts of the regime’s individual opponents. In post-conflict regimes, such killings are more likely to be a systematic practice; these practices, in turn, are positively associated with regime survival.

¹Data on pro-government militias from Carey, Mitchell and Lowe (2013), political killings from Pemstein et al. (2018).

Figure A4.3 considers several measures of *domestic* population mobility restrictions: for all citizens, men and women.² Although the results here are more uncertain than in the case of foreign travel, the relationship is in the same direction: post-conflict regimes have less freedom of movement than regimes long at peace. The association between these restrictions and regime survival, moreover, is significant and positive.

Figure A4.4 repeats this exercise for two more measures of censorship: the presence of critical print or broadcast media and internet censorship efforts (blocking access to websites, denial-of-service attacks, shutdowns).³ The patterns for traditional media are the same as those for freedom of discussion in Figure 7: post-conflict states have fewer critical media outlets, and regimes without critical media survive longer. Results for internet censorship, however, are not significant – presumably because internet censorship, like the internet itself, is a historically recent phenomenon, with insufficient data to detect a relationship in either direction.

Finally, Figure A4.5 replicates the models with a general, aggregate measure of political regime type: the Polity2 score (Marshall and Jaggers, 2002), which ranges from –10 (full autocracy) to +10 (full democracy). These results, presented only as a “sanity check,” confirm patterns we have observed with more specific measures of civil liberties. Post-conflict regimes are less democratic than those who have spent longer at peace. Less democratic regimes, in turn, have higher rates of survival post-conflict.

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²Data from Pemstein et al. (2018)

³Data from Pemstein et al. (2018)

Figure A4.2: Alternative measures of surveillance capacity. Quantities represent (a) $E[y_{it}|\tau]$ estimates from Equation 6, or the expected value of each dependent variable, at τ years after civil conflict (fixed effects $i = \text{Russia}$, $t = 1991$), and (b) Kaplan-Meier estimates from Equation 7, or the estimated fraction of regimes of each type surviving to time t . Shaded region is bootstrapped 95% confidence interval.






Figure A4.3: Alternative measures of mobility restrictions. Quantities represent (a) $E[y_{it}|\tau]$ estimates from Equation 6, or the expected value of each dependent variable, at τ years after civil conflict (fixed effects $i = \text{Russia}, t = 1991$), and (b) Kaplan-Meier estimates from Equation 7, or the estimated fraction of regimes of each type surviving to time t . Shaded region is bootstrapped 95% confidence interval.



(a) Mobility restrictions in post-conflict states



(b) Mobility restrictions and post-conflict regime survival

Figure A4.4: Alternative measures of censorship. Quantities represent (a) $E[y_{it}|\tau]$ estimates from Equation 6, or the expected value of each dependent variable, at τ years after civil conflict (fixed effects $i = \text{Russia}$, $t = 1991$), and (b) Kaplan-Meier estimates from Equation 7, or the estimated fraction of regimes of each type surviving to time t . Shaded region is bootstrapped 95% confidence interval.





Figure A4.5: Autocratic entrenchment in post-conflict states. Quantities represent (a) $E[y_{it}|\tau]$ estimates from Equation 6, or the expected value of each dependent variable, at τ years after civil conflict (fixed effects $i = \text{Russia}$, $t = 1991$), and (b) Kaplan-Meier estimates from Equation 7, or the estimated fraction of regimes of each type surviving to time t . Shaded region is bootstrapped 95% confidence interval.



(a) Autocracy in post-conflict states (b) Autocracy and post-conflict regime survival